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Wolfgang Zeev Rubinsohn <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Professor of classical history , Tel Aviv University

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# Mithradates VI Eupator Dionysos and Rome's Conquest of the Hellenistic East

Wolfgang Zeev Rubinsohn

The great Hellenistic historian Polybios, writing more than a generation before the events to be discussed here, pointed out that 'the Romans in less than fifty-three years [220–167 BC] have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole *oikoumenē* [the Mediterranean world] to their sole government — something unique in history' (Plb. 1.1.5). 'Since this date [220 BC] history has been an organic whole, and affairs of Italy and Lybia have been interlinked with those of Greece and Asia . . . ' (Plb. 1.3.4). It was the aim of the historian to show his contemporaries the merits and faults of Roman rule (Plb. 3.4.6–7). The conquest of the Hellenistic East in such a relatively short period was made possible by the fact that 'the wars in Greece and Asia are usually decided by a single battle, rarely by two' (Plb. 35.1.1). Polybios contrasted the short-lived resistance of the Hellenistic kings with the protracted and stubborn resistance to Roman imperialism put up by the native tribes of Spain. Yet, while modern historiography devotes much attention to Roman aggression in the Hellenistic East, Iberian affairs were left mostly to German and Spanish historians. This was due in part to the fact that Viriatus, the leader of Iberian resistance for eight years (147–139 BC), became an Iberian folk-hero for Spanish and German nationalists.<sup>1</sup> However, although ancient Pontos had in fact been part of the Hellenistic East, it had not belonged to a *Hochkultur*; it had been

This article was originally published in the *Masaoki Doi Festschrift*, ed. T. Tamura *et al.* (Tokyo, 1993, Japanese). The author's style has largely been retained for the footnotes and his system of Russian transliteration has also been preserved. For a full bibliographical list, see pp. 46–54 below.

1. W.Z. Rubinsohn (1982), 161–3, 172–80.

situated on the Euxine, and it produced no heirs to propagandize the name of its great king, Mithradates VI Eupator. Thus, though the war he waged has rightly been described as 'the last uprising of Hellenism against Rome',<sup>2</sup> we still lack an adequate up-to-date modern study of the Pontic king.<sup>3</sup> This article aims to stimulate interest in a subject the study of which is all too often relegated to that of a side-effect of the power-struggles of the Late Roman Republic.

Mithradates VI Eupator Dionysos, 'by far the greatest of the kings of Pontos',<sup>4</sup> was an unwilling — albeit persevering — enemy of the Roman Order in the Greek East. Roman tradition maintained that his war against Rome had lasted for 40 years, but as Orosius noted in his 'History against the Pagans' (6.1.28–30), 'the Mithradatic War, or to say it more truly, the disasters of the Mithradatic War . . . were drawn out and extended for 40 years . . . [from] the 662 year AUC, in which also the First Civil War began, blazing forth,<sup>5</sup> moreover, in the consulship of Cicero and Antony. . .

2. *Th. Lenschau* (1907), 238.
3. The last significant modern monographic study of Mithradates is that of *Theodore Reinach* (1895 - *German edn.*). Though unkindly disparaged by *U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff* as a 'Faiseur' (cf. *W.M. Calder III and A. Kosenina [eds.], 1989*), 132, Reinach's acribic scholarship utilized all epigraphic and numismatic evidence then available to supplement the unsatisfactory literary sources (Appian's *Mithradatica* being the only continuous source). Since the book was first published (Paris, 1890), so much new material has accrued that a new 'Gesamtdarstellung' is called for, as has been fairly recently noted by *A.N. Sherwin-White* (*TLS*, 7 Sept. 1984 [*Letters*]). *E. Olshausen* (1972), in *H. Temporini* (ed., 1972), 806–15, now the leading specialist on the subject, offers a good survey of modern scholarship prior to 1970/71. It should be used in conjunction with the bibliography in *B.C. McGing* (1986a), 180–89. Worthwhile are also *R.K. Bulin* (1983), and three articles by *D. Glew*, published in 1977 and 1981. *A.M. Badi* (1991), the sixth volume in the privately published series 'Les Grecs et les Barbares' by the same author, cannot be taken seriously.
4. *Florus* 1.40.1; cf. *Cic.*, *pro Murena* 32; *Acad.* 2.1.3; *Suet.*, *Caes.* 35 ('Mithradates Magnus'); *Plin.*, *H.N.* 25.3.5; *Vell.* II.18.1 (Sallustian origin of the passage postulated by *G. Kleiner* [1953], 95); *Justin.* 37.1.7–3.1; *Cic.*, *de Prov. Cons.* 27 (singular honours for Pompey).
5. *Appian*, *BC*, 1.5.33f.; 40, considered the 'bellum sociale' as part of the civil wars (*to emphyllion polemon*). For the use of the term 'Social War', cf. *R. Gardner* (1932), 185, n.1. For the connection between the three wars, cf. *D.S.* 37.2.12–13; 38.5 and *Chr. Meier* (1966), 221.

But in this period, 30 years are [to be found] for waging the war. Moreover, why many speak of 40 years is not easily discernible'. The so-called Social War began in 91 BC and Mithradates committed suicide in 63 BC, thus leaving us with a total, counting inclusively, of 29 years.<sup>6</sup> The problem, hinted at by Orosius, is not a problem of arithmetic, but rather one of the interpretation of the underlying causes of the First and Third Mithradatic Wars, and of the significance of the Peace of Dardanos. Thus, according to the predominant Roman view, Mithradates was an inveterate enemy, who had spent 40 years of his reign<sup>7</sup> in planning and putting into action devious designs against the Roman Order. The synchronization of the outbreak of the Social and the First Mithradatic War was meant to represent Mithradates, not necessarily truthfully, as taking advantage of Rome's temporary difficulties at home in order to activate his plan and to launch a treacherous attack.<sup>8</sup> It is the purpose of this paper to reconsider the evidence relating to the sources of the enmity of Mithradates towards Rome and, vice versa, of Rome's hatred and fear of the king.

The kings of Pontos proudly traced their descent from the Achaemenids on the paternal side,<sup>9</sup> and from Alexander the Great

6. The vexed question of the date of the outbreak of hostilities in the First Mithradatic War will be dealt with below (p. 29ff.). Appian (*Mithr.* 17 *ad fin.*) pp. 00 dates it 'about the 173rd Olympiad' (88-84 BC). Cicero (*de Imp.* 7), in 66 BC, referring either to the Italian Vespers in Asia or to Mithradates' attack on the province Asia, dates it 'to the twenty-third year' before (89/8 BC). Justinus (38.8.1) dates the war 'to the twenty-third year after his accession to the throne'; but we have no certain date for this event either. None of the dates justify a 40-year duration of the war, as is stated by Appian (*Mithr.* 112) or even 46 years (Justin. 37.1.7), unless some Roman politicians dated it from the partitioning of Paphlagonia by Mithradates and Nikomedes (Justin. 37.4.3; cf. *id.*, 38.3.6).
7. Florus I.40.2; App., *Mithr.* 112; Justin. 37.1.7 (46 years). P. Green (1990), 559, seemingly accepts a 40-year duration: '... at least from 103 BC Mithradates had been at odds with Rome'.
8. U. Kahrstedt (1948), 291, accepted this view. Already T. Reinach (1895), 109f., faulted Mithradates for missing this opportunity; cf. Sherwin-White (1980), 1981f., n. 1.
9. App., *Mithr.* 9; 112; Sall., *Hist.* 53 (Kritz); Tac., *Ann.* 12.18. Paternal descent wrongly stipulated from one of the seven Persians who killed the Magus (Hdt. III., 65 ff.) according to Plb. V.43.2; D.S. XIX.40.2; Florus I.40.1; *Auct. de Vir.* III. 76.1; cf. F.W. Walbank (1957), I, 573f; N. Lomouri (1979), I,

and the Seleucids on the maternal side.<sup>10</sup> Mithradates most willingly accepted his heritage,<sup>11</sup> and considered himself a true heir to the kingship of Asia. He seems to have held and propagated a disdain of Roman origins.<sup>12</sup> His claims to Asia are reminiscent of those of his ancestor, Antiochos Megas,<sup>13</sup> and he seems to have, at first, considered himself a friend, not a client, of Rome.<sup>14</sup> At latest since the time of his father, Mithradates Euergetes,<sup>15</sup> perhaps even since the time of his grandfather, Pharnakes, Pontos had been 'a friend and ally of the Roman People'.<sup>16</sup> His father, Mithradates V Euergetes, had defended

19ff. *E.A. Molev (1983)*, 131-8, again tried to show that the two traditions do not necessarily contradict each other. This view was already rejected by *A. v. Gutschmid, (1892)*, 495, as 'ungereimt'. Following *Gutschmid (496f)*, *J. Hornblower (1981)*, 74, 123, 243-5, accepting descent from one of the Seven, believes Hieronymus to have been a good source on the early history of the *Mithradatidae*.

10. Plb. 5.43.1-4; *J. Seibert (1967)*, 118ff; *McGing (1986b)*, 253f. *Reinach's [1895, 42, n.1]* supposition, that Laodike, the daughter of Antiochus IV Epiphanes (Plb. 33.15.18), was the mother of Mithradates Eupator, has not found acceptance in modern research; cf. *F. Staehelin (1924)*, 708-9; *Fr. Geyer (1932)*, 2163; *E. Olshausen (1978)*, 419; *F.W. Walbank (1979)*, III, 556; less sceptical is *Kleiner (1953)*, 76.
11. App., *Mithr.* 70; Justin. 38.5.3; 7.1: 'But as to himself . . . he was of more honourable origin than that mixed mass of settlers [the Romans], he who traced back his paternal ancestors to Cyrus and Darius, the founders of the Persian empire, and his maternal ancestors to Alexander the Great and Seleukos Nikator, who established the Macedonian empire'. For a discussion of the plastic and numismatic evidence, cf. *Kleiner (1953)*, 80f.; 86f; *D. Glew (1977)*, 105, 254f.
12. Sall. 4.69.17; discussed by *L.F. Raditsa (1970)*, 245-53; Justin. 38.6.7-8.
13. *Seibert (1967)*, 69, n. 84; 118f; for the view of Mithradates, according to Sallust, on Rome's treatment of Antiochos Megas, cf. Sall. 4.69.6, with *Raditsa (1969)*, 99-122; and cf. *E. Badian (1964)*, 122ff; *H.H. Schmitt (1964)*, 86-107; 271-95, *passim*.
14. Vell. 2.40.1: 'Mithridates, ultimus omnium iuris sui regum . . .' App., *Mithr.* 10; 12; 13; 16; 56. Correct is the view of *P.C. Sands (1908)*, 208f., 11. The fluidity in the interpretation of the real meaning of the title 'socius et amicus p. R.' in the 2nd and 1st centuries BC has caused a great divergence of opinions on the subject in modern research. I accept the interpretation of *E.S. Gruen (1984)*, I, 54-95, of 'philia amicitia' as an informal connection, 'a token of amicable – or simply non-hostile – dealings' (55).
15. App., *Mithr.* 10; 56 (Mithradates VI points out *philiias kai symmachias idias kai patrōes*); cf. *D. Magie (1950)*, II, 1090, n. 48.
16. IOSPE I 402 ll. 3-5; 25-8; the treaty of Pharnakes with Khersonesos obliged both contracting parties: *tēn tē pros Rōmaios filian diafylasontōn*; cf. Plb. XXV.2.13. *S. Burstein (1980)*, 6-7, dated the inscription to 155 BC, instead

Roman interests in Asia against Aristonikos and had been awarded Phrygia for his efforts.<sup>17</sup> Seemingly, it was in the revocation of this award that we have to seek the roots of Mithradates' resentful suspicion regarding the aims of Rome.<sup>18</sup> When Justinus, contrary to his usage, inserted a speech vindicating Mithradates for his war against

of 179 BC as was accepted previously; *W. Dahlheim (1965)*, 286, Anm. 3; *id. (1968)*, 265, n. 17. Following *E. Diehl (1938)*, 1850, *K.M. Kolobova (1949)*, 27-35, believed the phrase to have been inserted due to Roman pressure (p. 30f.), and that Pharnakes was the first of the kings of Pontos to display 'a definite anti-Roman tendency'. Unlikely to be correct is her surmise that his 'son Mithradates V paid for this [tendency] by death, because, as can be assumed, he was killed as a result of his refusal to sign a will leaving his kingdom to Rome' (p. 27). There is nothing of this in the sources (Str. 10.4.10; Justin. 37.1.6; cf. App., *Mithr.* 112; Memnon, *Frg.* 22.2). Correct is the view of *M. Rostovtzeff (1941)*, II, 83f.; 'Rome for some reason believed in their [i.e. Pharnakes' and Mithradates V's] loyalty and did not oppose the expansion of their kingdom, especially in the reign of Mithradates V Euergetes [in Anatolia] . . .'.

17. Strb. 14.1.38 (Subsumed among *oi tōn kappadokōn basileiis?*); Eutrop. 4.22.1 (confusing Mithradates V with his son); Oros. 5.10.2. Rewarded: App., *Mithr.* 12 (confusing Mithradates VI with his father). Justin. 37.1.2; 38.5.3. The extant sources leave several problems unresolved, but these do not immediately affect the present inquiry: why were only Mithradates V and the sons of Ariarathes V of Kappadokia ultimately rewarded, while Nikomedes III of Bithynia and Pylaemenes of Paphlagonia received nothing? Cf. *E.M. Sanford, (1950)*, 31-2; *N. Lomouri (1979)*, 64; what was the status of Galatia, which geographically links Pontos to Phrygia?; was southern Phrygia annexed to the province of Asia by M' Aquillius (cos. 129 BC) (CIL III. 7177) in 129-126 BC? cf. *A.N. Sherwin-White (1977a)*, 68-9; *B.C. McGing (1980)*, 38-9.
18. Thus already *Ed. Meyer, (1879)*, 86f. *T. Mommsen (1909)*, Vol. 3, 137f., speaks of 'half a century of hatred', i.e. from c.113 BC. There is no source-backed evidence for the views of *P. Waltz (1942)*, 214f., that Laodike was notoriously pro-Roman, or of *E.A. Molev (1976)*, 19f., that Mithradates V Euergetes was murdered 'by pro-Roman forces' or that from the first, 'partisans of subjugating Pontos to Rome, headed by the queen Laodike, did everything in their power to get rid of the heir of Euergetes [i.e. of Mithradates VI Eupator] in whom they saw a continuer of the latter's cause'. Cf. *A.I. Nemirovskij (1978)*, 68-9, n. 25; *Reinach*, 39, 44-6, had only suspected collusion between the personal (not political) ambitions of Laodike and the Roman Senate, 'which shared with her the fruits of the crime [of murdering Euergetes]'. For the murder of Euergetes by his *philoï*, cf. Str. 10.4.10; Justin. 37.1.6; App., *Mithr.* 112; Memnon, *Frg.* 22.2; Sall., *Hist.* 2.75. The pro-Roman plot of Lagetas, mentioned by Strabo (10.4.10; cf. 12.3.33), belongs to the time of the Third Mithradatic War.

Rome,<sup>19</sup> he cites him as saying: 'It was not a question of whether to take up arms or not, but whether to do so at a time favourable to themselves or to them [the Romans]. For they had already begun the war, when they took from him in his minority ('sibi pupillo') Greater Phrygia, which they had granted to his father as a prize for his help against Aristonikos. . . .'<sup>20</sup> Appian had dealt with the matter in his now lost *Hellenika*,<sup>21</sup> and his narrative concerning the allocation and subsequent revocation of Phrygia is inconsistent,<sup>22</sup> but he leaves no doubt as to the anger of Mithradates on account of Phrygia,<sup>23</sup> or as to the lengths to which the king was ready to go to get it back.<sup>24</sup>

If the Romans repossessed Phrygia early in the reign of Mithradates Eupator, this act may have influenced the decision of

19. Justin. 38.3.11. *Raditsa* (1970), p. 6, sees in Sallust's letter of Mithradates 'a Latin composition based on a close knowledge of Eastern propaganda and historiography'. This, I believe, is also true of Mithradates' speech to his troops, as cited in Justinus, and based on an oblique paraphrase in Pompeius Trogus; cf. also *McGing*, (1980), 36, n. 6; *id.* (1986), 160-62.
20. Justin. 38.5.2-3.
21. App., *Mithr.* 11.
22. *R.T. Sher* (1969), 74-7 (No. 13), with bibliography; *id.* (1984) (ed), 53f., for recent text and bibliography. For the inconsistencies in Appian's account of Phrygian affairs, cf. *McGing* (1980), 35-42.
23. App., *Mithr.* 11;13;56.
24. According to Appian (*Mithr.* 11; cf. 13, 56), in 90/89 BC Mithradates 'had recently (*enagchos*) been despoiled of Phrygia' and Kappadokia by the Romans, while according to Justinus (38.5.3) this had happened 'in his minority'. In 84 BC Sulla accused Mithradates VI that 'Manius gave Phrygia to you (*soi*) for a bribe' (App., *Mithr.* 57; cf. 13: '. . . he had bought Phrygia by a corrupt bargain from one of your generals . . .'), while according to Justinus (37.1.2) and Appian (*Mithr.* 12), albeit helped by bribery (Aul. Gell. 11.10.4), it had been awarded to Mithradates V Euergetes (cf. *Magie* [1950], I, 154f; II, 1043, n. 27; 1049, n. 41). *McGing*,(1980), 39f., has recently again made out a good case for Appian's confusing the two M' Aquilli (M' Aquillius cos. 129 BC with his son of the same name, cos.101 BC); for the difficulty of differentiation in this case by modern scholars, cf. *T.R.S. Broughton*(1986), 23f. (with bibliography). According to Justinus (l.c.) the king of Pontos claimed to have a legal right to Phrygia, since the time of Seleukos II Kallinikos (c. 245 BC; cf. *A. v. Gutschmid* (1892), 557f; *Seibert* (1967), 58; scepticism is expressed by *Magie* (1950), II, 1088, n. 38. Appian (*Mithr.* 12), as well as Eutropius (4.20.1), manage to confuse Mithradates Euergetes with Eupator in the context of the *Bellum Aristonicum*. Is it possible to assume, that both kings, on separate occasions, bribed both Aquillii in order to get back Phrygia? This conjecture might help explain the divergent and muddled accounts on the status of Phrygia in the years c. 129/126 - 85 BC.



the king to strive to enlarge his kingdom in the geographically opposite direction where no conflict with Roman interests could be anticipated.<sup>25</sup> The king apparently did not realize that Rome would regard every augmentation of his resources with suspicion. Do we read too much into Justinus (37,3.1) if we note a tone of censure in his words, that ‘when he [Mithradates] assumed the rule of the kingdom, he immediately bestowed thought on the enlargement, not on the administration, of the realm’? Appian (Mithr. 10) notes in a chronologically vague passage that, some 15 years later, the Romans ‘distrusted the great empire of Mithradates’. Memnon of Herakleia Pontika (22.3–4) and Plutarch (Marius 31.2–3) are our most explicit sources on the subject: ‘He [Mithradates] also subjugated by war the kings around the Phasis [modern Rioni]<sup>26</sup> as far as the regions beyond the Caucasus and [thus] increased his realm (*tēn archēn euxeīse*) and became extremely conceited. Because of this the Romans became all the more suspicious of his intent and decreed that he should restore to the Skythian kings<sup>27</sup> their ancestral realms.’ Already by 98 BC, according to Plutarch (Marius 31.2), ‘everybody [in Rome] anticipated a war’ which they suspected that Mithradates had been planning for a long time.

Unfortunately, we are unable to date Mithradates’ conquest of the northern and eastern littoral of the Euxine, but the last decade of the second century BC seems to be the most likely.<sup>28</sup> These conquests and that of Armenia Minor provided Eupator with a recruiting ground and an economic base that was to prove more enduring

25. Sall., *Hist.* 4.69.10; cf. Justin. 38.7.3-4: ‘He [Mithradates] had entered the Pontic War much more timidly and diffidently [than now the war against Rome], because he then had been young and inexperienced. For the Pontic war, cf. *Olshausen* (1978), 420-22 (with bibliography); *W.Z. Rubinsohn* (1980), 50-70; *McGing* (1986), 43-65.

26. Str. 11.2.17; 14.7. cf. *O. Lordkipandize* (1979), 123-30; *Lomouri* (1979), 76f.

27. *McGing* (1986a), 63f.

28. *Magie* (1950), II, 1092, n. 53, summarizes the evidence for the date and modern interpretation; rejecting it as too early: *Meyer* (1879), 91 (115-106 BC), and *B. Niese* (1887), 567-9 (114/13 - 110 BC). *Magie* and most modern scholars follow *Reinach* (1895), 58, n. 3; p. 63, n. 1 (110-107; 96-90 BC); *Waltz* (1942), 214-17 (111-103 BC); *V.F. Gajdukevic* (1971), 313-18 (c.110 - c.95 BC); following *Reinach* (1895), 71f., *Olshausen* (1972), 809-10: ‘Spätestens in der Mitte der 90er Jahre war das Schwarze Meer . . . ein Mare

even than that in his hereditary domain, Pontos.<sup>29</sup> These benefits, *per se*, offered a sufficient incentive for his campaigns in that region, and there seems to be no reason for the suggestion that they were but the means for a future expulsion of the Romans from the whole of Asia Minor.<sup>30</sup> If Roman suspicions were aroused by his activity at that time, they gave no sign of this.<sup>31</sup> According to Justinus (37.3.4–5), as so often our only source on many of Mithradates' activities prior to the First Mithradatic War, Eupator 'pondered on Asia' ('quum de Asia tractaret'; cf. Justin, 38.3.1.3.6: 'Romanum meditabundus bellum') only after his northern and eastern campaigns. He went on a reconnaissance trip of 'all towns, local conditions and regions', behaving in Bithynia as if he were already master of Asia ('quasi dominus Asiae'), while taking note of whatever might aid him in an attempt at its conquest. Though 'universam . . . pervagatus est' does suggest that he reconnoitred the Roman

Mithradaticum geworden'; thus, also, *Lomouri* (1979), 75-80 (111-107 BC); *D.B. Šelov* (1980), 29f. More restrained is *Molev* (1976), 24-6f., 54-6, who believes that the hill-tribes of the northern Caucasus and the Greek towns on the western littoral of the Black Sea (Messembria, Apollonia) were subdued by Mithradates only during the Third Mithradatic War.

29. Str. 7.4.6 (grain and silver); App., *Mithr.* 13;15; 41; 64; Oros. 6.21.28 (troops). Cf., *Magie* (1950), I, 195f; II, 1092, n. 54; *Gajdukevič* (1971), 318ff; *Molev* (1976), 56-69; *D.B. Šelov* (1978), 143, 57f; *id.* (1980), 32-5; *Sherwin-White* (1984), 103f; *V.M. Kadeev and S.B. Soročan* (1989), 17.
30. *Magie* (1950), I, 195f; *E. Will* (1967), II, 392-7; *S.Yu. Saprykin* (1986), 212f.
31. Thus, already *Mommsen* (<sup>10</sup>1909), II, 277: 'Aber nachdem der Knabe [Mithradates Eupator] dann zu seinen Jahren gelangt war, bewies derselbe Senat gegen dessen allseitige Übergriffe und gegen diese imponente Machtbildung, deren Entwicklung vielleicht einen zwanzigjährigen Zeitraum ausfüllt, völlige Passivität'; *Rostovtzeff* (1959), II, 834-5. Cf., more recently, *D.G. Glew* (1977a), 386ff; *W.V. Harris* (1979), 273, citing Appian (*Mithr.* 10), dismisses the remark concerning Roman suspicions as 'simply conjecture'. Two of the sources concerning Roman suspicions about Mithradates' ultimate aims stem from a date after the outbreak of war; App., *Mithr.* 57 (Sulla's accusations in 85 BC are taken seriously by *Sherk* (1969), n. 2; Florus 1.40.3: '[Mithradates alleged that Cassius was the cause of the war, while in reality] elatus animis ingentibus Asiae totius et, si posset, Europae cupiditate flagrabat'; Memnon (F22. 3-4), dated Roman suspicions to the king's Skythian campaigns (cf. p. 11 above), and mentions a warning by the Senate which allegedly achieved partial compliance; Mithradates' control of the North Black Sea littoral does not corroborate this version.

province as well,<sup>32</sup> in view of what followed — the occupation of Paphlagonia, Galatia, and Kappadokia and only much later, of Bithynia — I tend to believe that Mithradates restricted his travels to inner Asia Minor, ending his tour in Bithynia, though here too, one cannot be certain. As far as we know, the Romans never brought up the subject of his trip as a first hostile act of the king, though it would have proved that their suspicions of his plans were well founded.

That difficulties at home did not deter the Romans from intervening at discretion in local affairs in Asia Minor, is shown by their reaction to the partitioning of Paphlagonia by Mithradates and Nikomedes III Euergetes of Bithynia.<sup>33</sup> If the kings, following Roman reverses in 105 BC,<sup>34</sup> had treated Roman demands with disdain, they soon had second thoughts.<sup>35</sup> Probably in 102/1 BC, 'envoys of king Mithradates arrived in Rome, bringing with them a large sum of money with which to bribe the [Roman] senate'. The

32. Meyer (1879), 91,103; Reinach (1845), 72, n. 2; 83; Geyer, (1932), 2166; Magie (1950), I, 196; II, 1093, n. 55. H. Bengtson (1975), 257, believes that mainly the Roman province and Bithynia had been the target of the trip; slightly sceptical regarding the trip is Olshausen (1978), 422f. Badian (1956), 119, showed that 'Asia' could be applied well beyond the *provincia* Asia, and cf. S.I. Oost (1981), 265-82, for the various meanings of 'Asia' in the sources.
33. Justin. 37.4.4: '[Paphlagoniam] quum teneri a regibus senatui nuntiatum esset, legatos ad utrumque misit, qui gentem restitui in pristinum statum juberent'. Was this the *legatio Asiatica* of M. Aemilius Scaurus, as G. Bloch (1909), 25, 30-33, thought? Did he go on a *legatio Asiatica*?; cf. McGing (1986), 77, n. 41. The lack of an immediate Roman military response has all too often been explained as due to 'a lack of forces to deal with such a *fait accompli*'; e.g., by Magie (1950), I, 197; Bulin (1983), 29, n. 15; but cf. Glew (1977), 390, on the whole problem of an alleged Roman manpower shortage at this time, cf. J.W. Rich (1983), 287-331.
34. For the sources, see A J.H. Greenidge and A.M. Clay (?1961), 83ff.
35. According to Justinus 37.4.4-9 (cf. Pompeius Trogus, *Prol.* 37), the kings refused. Characteristically, Nikomedes tried to cloak his greed by having recourse to subterfuge and tried to pass off his son as a legitimate heir of the Ariarathids named Pylaemenes (Justin. 37.4.7-8). Mithradates, on the other hand, was openly defiant and 'imagining himself an equal to the Romans', and 'undaunted by threats', he occupied Galatia as well; cf. F. Staehelin (?1907; repr. 1973), 86. Sherwin-White (1977a), 71, n. 62; *id.* (1984), 104-5. We know from Diodoros Siculus (36.3.1) that in 104 BC a senatorial embassy to Nikomedes had at first been refused the dispatch of a Bithynian contingent

trial of Saturninus need not here concern us,<sup>36</sup> but even if — for political reasons of their own — some Roman senators colluded with the Pontic envoys to foil the plans of Saturninus,<sup>37</sup> the Senate preferred to leave territorial affairs in Asia Minor undefined. Only after the annexation of Kappadokia by Mithradates, did the Romans decide to link the issues of Paphlagonia and Kappadokia and, in the mid-nineties, ordered both Mithradates and Nikomedes out of the newly-occupied territories.<sup>38</sup>

Meanwhile, the kings had quarrelled over Kappadokia. Pontos had begun meddling in Kappadokian affairs during the reign of Eupator's father, Mithradates V Euergetes. Mithradates V had married his daughter Laodike to the only surviving son of Ariarathes V Eusebes Philopator, Ariarathes VI Epiphanes Philopator.<sup>39</sup> After the latter's murder by a Kappadokian noble, Gordios, imputedly at the behest of Mithradates VI Eupator in 111 BC, his nephew, a minor, assumed the kingship as Ariarathes VII Philometor,<sup>40</sup> under the regency of his mother, Laodike, the sister of Eupator. Sometime between 102 BC and 100 BC Nikomedes invaded Kappadokia.

to help in the war against the Cimbri, though in 103 BC we find 800 Bithynians among the troops of L. Likinius Lukullus in Sicily (D.S. 36.8.1); for the dilemma facing Nikomedes III regarding Paphlagonia and Rome, cf. *R.D. Sullivan* (1990), 31, 38. It is worth noting that there is no mention of a similar appeal to Mithradates for auxiliaries; on this, cf. *W.Z. Rubinsohn* (1982), 444-7 (with further references).

36. D.S. 36.15.1; cf. *E.S. Gruen* (1968), 168-9, 191; *T.R.S. Broughton* (1987), 54-8 (with references). Possibly the passage from Valerius Maximus (3.7.8) is connected with this affair; cf. *M.C. Alexander* (1981), 7, n. 24; *B.A. Marshall* (1985), 134f.
37. *A. Keaveney* (1986), 43f., blames Saturninus for trying to start a war in which his friend Marius would get the command.
38. Justin. 38.2.6. cf. n. 57 below.
39. App., *Mithr.* 10;12; Justin. 38.1.1. Cf. *Magie* (1950), 1,194; *Seibert* (1967), 116, 119. For the dates of their reigns, cf. now *F. Raditsa* (1983), 115. Five other sons of Ariarathes V, who had fallen in battle against Aristonikos, had been murdered by their mother; cf. Justin. 37.1.3-5; with *Glew* (1977a), 383, n.11 (with references to earlier works).
40. Justin. 38.1.1-5; *B. Simonnet* (1961), 16f., dated this event to 116 BC, but the traditional date, accepted since *B. Niese* (1895), 819, and *Reinach* (1895), 81f., seems preferable, since it makes his minority throughout his reign more likely; cf. *Glew* (1977a), 387, n. 32.

Mithradates hastened to intervene on behalf of the legitimate ruler, but his sister came to an understanding with and married Nikomedes, by now Eupator's enemy.<sup>41</sup> Mithradates, thereupon, invaded Kappadokia and restored his nephew to the throne, but following a quarrel over the return of Gordios to the country, Mithradates murdered Ariarathes VII and (in 101 BC) installed his own eight-year-old son as king, with the title of Ariarathes IX Eusebes Philopator, claiming that this was a (grand-?) son of Ariarathes V Eusebes Philopator.<sup>42</sup> The *de facto* regent was the Kappadokian noble Gordios.<sup>43</sup>

'The Kappadokians, however, being harassed by the cruelty and licentiousness of their rulers, revolted from Mithradates, and sent for the brother of their [last Ariarathid] king, who was also called Ariarathes [VIII], from Asia . . .'<sup>44</sup> The unfortunate incumbent was driven out of his kingdom by Mithradates, and died soon afterwards 'from a sickness connected with a nervous breakdown'.<sup>45</sup> At this time Marius came to Asia Minor and met with Mithradates.<sup>46</sup> This meeting had a profound effect on Mithradates. To judge by his acts till then, he had believed that the Roman establishment could be bribed into acquiescence with his schemes. Marius, whatever his

41. Justin. 38.1.4; *Seibert* (1967), 117; *Glew* (1977a), 388, n. 34.

42. Justin. 38.1;2.5; on this cf. *Reinach* (1895), 91, n. 2. The beginning of his reign must be dated to mid-101 BC, since now coins from his 15th year (87 BC) have been found; cf. *Simonneta* (1961), 18; *O. Mørholm* (1968), in *C.M. Kraay and G.K. Jenkins* (eds.), 255-7; *Sherwin-White* (1977b), 180, nn. 41, 42. Contrary to general scholarly opinion, *Glew* (1977a), 388-90, tried to show that Mithradates' goal was 'to preserve the status quo, not to disrupt it'. The evidence, seemingly, does not support this view. Mithradates was renewing the policy of Pharnakes of 183-179 BC, which, while expansionist, was not in itself anti-Roman; cf. *Magie* (1950), I, 190-94; *R.B. McShane* (1964), 161-3.

43. See the judicious remarks of *Sullivan* (1990), 39, n. 23 on Gordios' aspirations to the throne of Kappadokia.

44. Justin. 38.2.1; cf. *Bulin* (1983), 39, n. 23.

45. Justin. 38.2.2. Ariarathes VIII apparently coined money for a year and two months; cf. n. 40 above.

46. *Badian* (1964), 17f., established the date of Marius' voyage as 99-98 BC; and that of the meeting as having taken place in 98 BC; cf. *Bulin* (1983), 28-9.

ulterior motives,<sup>47</sup> proved him wrong. ‘Though Mithradates received him with courtesy and respect, Marius became neither more ready to make concessions nor milder, but said: “O King, either endeavour to be stronger than the Romans, or silently obey the orders of Rome”. These words frightened Mithradates, who indeed had often heard of the Roman way of speaking, but now for the first time experienced their boldness of speech’.<sup>48</sup> Mithradates apparently decided to change his *modus operandi*, and to adapt it to the advice of Marius: to be quiet and, if possible, to avoid a direct confrontation with Rome, while trying to implement his aspirations in an easterly direction.

The restoration of Pontic pre-eminence in Kappadokia alarmed Nikomedes and Laodike. The fearful Bythian monarch decided to thwart imaginary (?) Pontic designs on Bithynia by putting forth a supposititious third son of the late Ariarathes VI as the rightful heir of Ariarathes VIII, and thus create a Bithynian ‘security zone’ in Kappadokia. Nikomedes sent his spouse, Laodike, to Rome to secure recognition for the pretender.<sup>49</sup> This move was hardly remarkable, since Bithynian subservience to Rome had already sickened Polybios, but not the Senate, when Prusias had visited the city in 167/6 BC.<sup>50</sup> Noteworthy, I submit, was Mithradates’ response to

47. Plut., *Mar.* 31.2; cf. *T.R.S. Broughton (1953)*, 210-11, stressed the religious aspect, already mentioned by *W. Schur (1942)*, 100-101; yet, the latter like *G. Bloch and J. Carcopino (1940)*, II, 350-52, and *T.J. Luce (1970)*, 162-8, stressed the military aspirations of Marius. *E. Badian (1968)*, 32, rightly rejected this interpretation. *T.F. Carney (1970)*, 25; 27, n. 140; 45-7, nn. 212, 220, tried to make Marius a ‘Figurehead of Big Business Interests in Foreign Politics’, who attempted to further simultaneously ‘equestrian interests and his own chance of a command’. On this *Chr. Meier (1964)*, 65, caustically remarked, ‘von all dem steht in den Quellen kein Wort’; but the opinion reappears in *N.K. Rauh (1986)*, 314f. *Bulin (1983)*, 27, n. 2; 30-34, in summing up the various views, saw especial importance in that ‘diese Aktivitäten vom Senat ausgingen’.
48. Plut., *Mar.* 31.3. *Luce (1970)*, 168, wrongly posits that ‘Rome had given Mithradates no commands as yet . . .’, disregarding the order of 104 BC (?) to evacuate Paphlagonia, mentioned by Justinus (37.4.4); cf. *M. Sordi (1973)*, 371f.; 375; *Bulin (1983)*, 29, n. 15.
49. Justin. 38.2.3-4.
50. Plb. 30.18.1-5; Liv. 45.44.4-9; 18-20; for further references, cf. *Walbank (1979)*, 3, 441f.

this demarche: the dispatch of Gordios to Rome, seeking recognition for Ariarathes IX.<sup>51</sup> The mission of Gordios was a *de facto* recognition by Mithradates of Rome's right to decide matters concerning nominally independent states in Asia Minor.<sup>52</sup> 'But the Senate, having understood the designs of the kings, who were stealing the kingdoms of others by [using] false names, took Kappadokia from Mithradates, and as a solace to him — Paphlagonia from Nikomedes'.<sup>53</sup>

Not unlike some statesmen of modern superpowers, the Senate had no real understanding of the realities of politics in distant Asia Minor and offered the peoples of Paphlagonia and Kappadokia their 'liberty'.<sup>54</sup> The Kappadokians declined to accept the 'munus libertatis', and, after Mithradates had withdrawn Ariarathes IX, a civil war ensued between the supporters of Gordios and those of a somewhat retarded ('*segni admodum*' — Justin) Kappadokian non-Ariarathid noble, Ariobarzanes.<sup>55</sup> It seems that Justinus (38.5.9) was right in claiming that the Kappadokians preferred Gordios but that the Romans imposed Ariobarzanes, since they had to intervene and restore the latter several times, till he gladly abdicated in favour of his son in 63 BC.<sup>56</sup> This is hardly the record of a ruler who enjoyed broad popular support, but rather an indication that his epithet 'Philoromaïos' was indeed well chosen.

51. Justin. 38.2.5.

52. According to Strabo (12.2.11), Kappadokia enjoyed a special relationship with Rome, on and off, since 188 BC, because 'as soon as the Romans, after conquering Antiochus, began to administer the affairs of Asia, and were forming friendships and alliances with the tribes and the kings, that in all other cases they gave this honour to the kings individually, but gave it to the king of Kappadokia and the tribe jointly'. *Sands* (1908), 29f; 200-203, has assembled the principle sources; *Magie* (1950), I, 201f; II, 1096, nn. 7-8; Rome prided herself on having been faithful to the sons of the erstwhile ally, Ariarathes V (Justin. 33.1.4).

53. Justin. 38.2.6. On Roman attitudes towards these Hellenistic kings, cf. the stimulating article of the late *E. Rawson* (1975), 152, 157f.

54. For the reality behind the term 'populi liberi', cf. *Badian* (1958), 74, 87; *H. Gesche* (1981), 59-68; *Gruen* (1984), I, 145-57; *S. Podes* (1986), 296-302; *J.-L. Ferrary* (1988), 225 (and cf. 22, n. 70); *J. Rich* (1989), in *A. Wallace-Hadrill* (ed.), 118-23.

55. Str. 12.2.11; Justin. 38.2.8; cf. *W. Hoben* (1969), 145, n. 30.

56. Val. Max. 5.7 Ext. 2; cf. *Sands* (1908), 89, 203-4; *Hoben* (1969), 144-54; *R.D. Sullivan* (1980), 1128-36, who is, I submit, too kind in his estimate of Ariobarzanes.

In his programmatic speech of 89 BC Mithradates asked the rhetorical question, 'which of their orders had he disobeyed? Had he not evacuated Phrygia and Paphlagonia, and withdrawn his son from Kappadokia?' Though Rome, as we have seen, 'took Paphlagonia from Nikomedes' as a solace to Mithradates, he saw their actions differently. Apparently, at this time Paphlagonia, which had been partitioned in *circa* 105 BC, was in Pontic hands, and depriving Mithradates of it was to him paramount to a second Roman act of war against him.<sup>57</sup> Self-serving as this presentation of his case certainly was,<sup>58</sup> Mithradates was faced with an intractable problem, Roman suspicion of himself and his aims (cf. p. 11 above). If in 98 BC Marius, by order of the Senate, had been satisfied with issuing a stern warning, by now, in 96 BC,<sup>59</sup> Sulla, by

57. Justin. 38.5.4-7: 'Quid, quum Paphlagonia se decedere jusserint, non alterum illud genus belli fuisse?'
58. Like Mithradates' Letter in Sallust (*Hist.* 4.69), the speech in Justinus 'is a Latin composition based on a close knowledge of Eastern propaganda and historiography', *Raditsa* (1969), 6; cf. *McGing* (1986), 160f.
59. In an early article *E. Badian* (1956), 117-23, suggested that the *legatio Asiatica* of M. Aemilius Scaurus, ordering the evacuation of Paphlagonia and Kappadokia, should be dated to 96 BC, and connected this mission with the transformation of the provincia Asia from a praetorian into a consular province for 94 BC. Though *T.N. Mitchell* (1979), 27, accepted Badian's suggestion, it has not gained wide acceptance; cf. *Broughton* (1986), 3,145f. (citing previous literature against Badian's view). On the chronology here I mainly follow the revised dating of *Badian* (1964), 172-3, as modified by *G.V. Sumner* (1978), 395, and *Broughton* (1986), III, 73-4, who were duly influenced by *Sherwin-White* ([1977a], 70-72; *id.* [1977b], 174, n. 8 and 175 n. 11; 182 n. 51; *id.* [1984], 108-11), who argues against 96/5 as the year of Sulla's pro-praetorship in Asia Minor; cf. *A. Keaveney* (1981), 194, n.31. The matter of the date of the installation of Tigranes II as king of Armenia no earlier than 95 BC was disposed of beforehand by *Badian* (1964), 176, n. 49. And rightly so. No certainty is possible on this date; cf. *Ya. Manandyan* (1943), 26; *D.M. Lang* (1983), in the *Cambridge History of Iran*, 3(1), 513; *Sullivan* (1990), 97-101. That 95 BC was an 'annus tranquillus' according to *Obsequens* (50), may be irrelevant to Sulla's command, since the latter 'brought with him few [Roman] troops, but with the help of many zealous allies' expelled Gordios (*Plut.*, *Sulla* 5.3-4). *Badian* (1964), 177, n. 57, is, I believe, unduly critical of the numismatic evidence, though, as *Sherwin-White* (1977b), 180, readily admitted, it too 'is enigmatic'. I propose the years 101-96 BC for the quinquennium of Ariarathes IX. In mid-96 BC Gordios and Ariobarzanes vied for the election to the Kappadokian throne; Ariobarzanes



order of the Senate, was ready to enforce compliance. He had been dispatched to Asia Minor under the pretence of restoring Ariobarzanes, 'but in reality to keep Mithradates in check, who had become overly enterprising and had nearly doubled his might and state'.<sup>60</sup> At first, Archelaos, the general of Mithradates, apparently managed to force Sulla to enter into negotiations, an encouraging development for the king, but in the end 'taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the truce . . . he [Sulla] slipped out of his [Archelaos'] hands', and after chasing Gordios out of Kappadokia, restored Ariobarzanes to the throne.<sup>61</sup> Despairing of military means to achieve his aims, Mithradates may have had recourse to the method of trying to bribe Sulla, but to no avail.<sup>62</sup> Paphlagonia was left 'free',<sup>63</sup> Kappadokia was in the hands of Ariobarzanes, while of

was elected and ousted by Gordios, though his election was confirmed by the Roman Senate (Justin. 38.2.8; cf. App., *Mithr.* 13), at 'the same time' (Justin. 38.3.1) as Tigranes returned to the throne of Armenia. Ariobarzanes was restored to the throne by Sulla in 95 BC (Sullivan [1980], 1131, n. 27; R. Kallet-Marx [1990], 44.2, 127, n. 15), and coined drachms in 95, 94, 92 and 91 BC (years 2+3, 5+6); cf. *Simoneta* (1961), 41f.; *McGing* (1984), 172-5. Ariobarzanes was ousted again by Tigranes' generals, Mithraas and Bagoas, in 91 BC; cf. *Sherwin-White* (1984), 111, n. 54. *Bulin* (1983), 35-44, gives a summary of the diverse scholarly interpretations of Kappadokian affairs, while returning to *Reinach's* (1895), 97-9, dating of Sulla's pro-praetorship to 92 BC.

60. Plut., *Sulla* 5.3; cf. App., *Mithr.* 10: 'The Romans ordered him [Mithradates] to restore Kappadokia to Ariobarzanes . . . perhaps because they distrusted the great empire of Mithradates and sought covertly to divide it into several parts'. Cf. the discussion of Sulla's command by *Magie* (1950), II, 1163-65; and the categorical tone on its aims in *Th. Frankfort* (1963), 184.
61. Front., *Strat.* 1.5.18; Plut., *Sulla* 5.4; Liv., *Ep.* 70; App., *Mithr.* 57. Cf. *McGing* (1986), 78, n. 46.
62. Plut., *Sulla* 5.7; Firm. Math., *Mathesis* 1.7.28. Cf. *Gruen* (1966), 51f; *id.*, (1968), 198. In 85 BC Sulla told Mithradates, 'you ought to have opposed it [the restoration of Ariobarzanes] and given your reasons then, or forever after held your peace' (App., *Mithr.* 57). This remark either exculpates Sulla, or was meant to exculpate him *ex post facto*. *Schur* (1942), 104, n. 2, connected the accusation to money Sulla extorted from Nikomedes and Ariobarzanes.
63. Orosius (6.2.2) and Eutropius (5.5.2) have a Pylaemenes, *rex et amicus*, as king of Paphlagonia in 89 BC; cf. *B. Niese* (1883), 572-4; *Magie* (1950), 1098f., nn.14,19. Galatia was pro-Roman at the time of the outbreak and in the course of the First Mithradatic War; cf. App., *Mithr.* 11; 17. Mithradates surmised he had cause to believe 'that none of them would be faithful to him if Sulla should come near'; App., *Mithr.* 46; 58; Plut., *Mor.* 259 A-B; cf. *Niese* (1883), 584-5; *Staehelin* (<sup>2</sup>1907; repr. 1973), 86f; *Hoben* (1969), 56-62.

Galatia we know nothing at this time. The only gain Mithradates achieved through his activities during the last decade was to direct Roman attention to himself, which augured bleakly for his future.

But in 94 BC matters began to look better for the king. Mithradates' erstwhile ally and later enemy, Nikomedes III Euergetes, died 'of old age or by poison',<sup>64</sup> and his son by Nysa (probably of royal Ariarathid origin),<sup>65</sup> Nikomedes IV Philopator, succeeded him with the Senate's blessing.<sup>66</sup> The latter's marriage to another Nysa, a daughter of Ariarathes VI, indicated a possible tendency to meddle in the future in Kappadokia, where the old royal house still had adherents.<sup>67</sup> Mithradates sensed a potential rival and tried to get rid of Nikomedes, a king no less murderous than himself, by assassination.<sup>68</sup> When this failed, he fielded a rival claimant to the Bithynian throne, an illegitimate son of Nikomedes Euergetes, Sokrates Khrestos, an ironic surname for a treacherous creature who had tried in vain to gain Roman recognition for his claim to the throne.<sup>69</sup> Mithradates apparently sent troops to oust Nikomedes, who

64. Licinian., 35. 87 (Criniti).

65. Memnon, F. 22.5; *contra* Justin. 38.5.10 ('saltatricis filio'); cf. *Reinach* (1895), 106, n.1; *F. Geyer* (1936), 497; *Magie* (1950), II, 1200, n. 47.

66. App., *Mithr.* 7; 10; Licinian., 35.84 (Criniti); Justin. 38.3.4; Memnon, F. 22.5; cf. *Magie* (1950), I, 319; *Sullivan* (1990), 33; 343, n.14.

67. Licinian., 35. 89 (Criniti); *Seibert* (1967), 117f.

68. App., *Mithr.* 57. We do not know when Nikomedes levelled this charge against Mithradates, and whether it was true.

69. Licinian. 35. 86; 90; 93-4 (descent and treachery); 91 (Criniti): 'Romam ad regnum expetendum frustra profectus . . .'. The palimpsest of Licinianus has nothing to indicate the further career of Sokrates Khrestos, and, if this were our only source, we might have been tempted to believe that he stayed in Euboia and never returned to Asia Minor. But the other sources show that Mithradates duly installed him as king of Bithynia, and that after the Roman Senate declared war on Khrestos, Mithradates killed him in order to please them (Justin. 38.5.8). The chronology and the sequence of events is elusive. A *terminus ante quem* for the arrival of Nikomedes at Rome may be provided by the date of Hortensius' speech on his behalf after Crassus' consulship in 95 BC, and some time ('nuper') prior to September 91 BC; cf. *Cic.*, *de Or.* 3, 229: 'pro Bithyniae rege' in Cicero can only mean the king recognized by Rome, viz. Nikomedes. Seemingly, the kings were driven out and lobbied for their restoration in the first half of 91 BC, when the attention of the Senate was focused on the proposed legislation of Livius Drusus.

fled to Rome,<sup>70</sup> and 'Sokrates drew to himself the rule of the Bithynians. At the same time Mithraas and Bagoas drove out this Ariobarzanes . . . and installed Ariarathes [IX, as king of Kappadokia]'.<sup>71</sup> Both kings, Nikomedes and Ariobarzanes, had been officially recognized by Rome, and their expulsions aroused ire in the Senate, which was traditionally suspicious of alliances of kings on the eastern borders,<sup>72</sup> and Mithradates, by associating 'himself in alliance with the Parthians and Medes and Armenian Tigranes and Skythian kings and the Iberian [king] . . . added [to these activities] other causes (*aitei*) for war. For when the Senate in Rome set up Nikomedes [IV] . . . as king of Bythynia, Mithradates set up [Sokrates] . . . in opposition to Nikomedes'.<sup>73</sup>

This passage in Memnon clearly benefited from hindsight. Though Mithradates later on complained that the Senate blamed him for everything that Gordios and Tigranes did,<sup>74</sup> we are asked by Appian to believe that this august body was blissfully unaware of the fact that Mithradates had initiated the actions against the two kings, who were present in Rome to incriminate him. When the Senate decided to reinstate the kings at the end of 91 BC, they entrusted the task to a legion headed by the consular M' Aquillius, not to a military commander with *imperium* and an army.<sup>75</sup> The

70. Cf. n. 59 above; Justin. 38.3.3-4.

71. App., *Mithr.* 10; 57. *Manandyan* (1943), 31f., sees Mithraas and Bagoas as generals of Tigranes.

72. *J. Vogt* (1940; repr.1966), 21-5; *P. Veyne* (1975), 793-895, repeatedly uses the term 'finlandisation' to describe Rome's aims, though (p. 837) he warns against Holleaux's concept of an unchangeable, 'Bismarckian' Roman foreign policy.

73. Memnon, F 22. 4-5; cp. App., *Mithr.* 13; 15 (*ad fin.*); 57; Eutrop. 5.5.1-2; Oros. 6.2.1.

74. Justin. 38.5.8.

75. Concerning this decision, knowledge of the precise chronology would be crucial. *Prima facie* it seems that the decision on sending the mission was taken before the murder of Livius Drusus and the outbreak of the Social War. I follow the chronology suggested by *Badian* (1976), 109f., on this matter. The composition of this embassy is also unclear. According to Appian (*Mithr.* 21), M' Aquillius (cos. 101 BC), 'the principal instigator of this embassy', served as its 'hegemon' (Mithr.11), a term not to be found in the Republican period for heads of Roman embassies; on this, cf. *D.A. Bowman* (1987), 133-6; Mallius Malthinus, his colleague, is known only from Pompeius Trogus/

legation was to have the military co-operation of C. Cassius, the governor of the *provincia* Asia, 'who was in charge of a small army', of Mithradates, and of other local levies.<sup>76</sup> This means that Rome did not expect a war but a limited campaign based, like the first phase of the *Bellum Aristonikum* or the mission of Sulla, on local levies.<sup>77</sup> Concerning the appeal to Mithradates, it seems that several interpretations of Rome's decision are possible: either, as already noted, the Senate had no clear idea of his part in the recent developments in Asia Minor, meaning that it disbelieved the information provided by the interested parties; or, that the Senate decided to test his intentions. Reading Appian's *Mithradatica* (chs. 11–17) tends to leave me with the impression that the Senate, if it took time to think about Mithradates — which is by no means certain — had not reached a decision to go to war with him. With habitual arrogance they probably expected that Mithradates would comply, as indeed he did as far as Khrestos and the renewed withdrawal of Ariarathes IX were concerned.

Justinus (Prol. 38; Justin. 38.3.4; 3.8; 4.4), while Appian (*Mithr.* 19) mentions a *magkinos* (mss.), or a *manios* (the text of H. White, in *LCL*, II, 272), while in *Mithr.* 17 and 21 Appian wrote *manios*, when he meant Aquillius. *Fr. Münzer* (1928), 1190 (Nos. 59, 61), prefers to distinguish between Malthinus and Mancinus, as did *Luce* (1970), 188–9. *Sherwin-White* (1984), 119, n. 88, doubts the cognomen 'Malt(h)inus', but *L.R. Taylor* (1960), 224, 231, and *T.P. Wiseman* (1971), 240 (No. 246), accept it. The suggestion of *Klebs* (1895), 326, that Malthinus may be a corruption of M. (or M') Atilius has found no adherents. The correct date for the start of the activity of the embassy in Asia Minor is 90 BC, now in *Broughton* (1986), III, 24f., corrected from *Broughton* (1951), II, 35.

76. App., *Mithr.* 11: 'Manius, with the army of the former [Cassius], and a large force collected from the Galatians and Phrygians, restored . . . [the kings]'; Justin. 38.3.4; 7: ' . . . Aquillium et Malthinum Asiatico exercitu instructos...'; Cass. Dio 31.99.2a.
77. For Aristonikos, cf. OGIS 435; Str. 14.1.38; Oros. 5.10.2; cf. *J. Vogt* (1965), 33, 65–7; *Z. Rubinsohn* (1973), 107, 560–61. For Roman ambassadors conducting military campaigns, cf. *Bowman* (1987), 236–45; *B. Schleussner* (1976) 106, n. 49, denies that Roman ambassadors performed command duties.

Mithradates' intentions are even more difficult to fathom.<sup>78</sup> According to Appian (*Mithr.* 11), 'Mithradates being angry with the Romans . . . did not co-operate', meaning that he resented their again meddling in the affairs of Kappadokia in his own back yard, and therefore did not actively support them, but 'when the Roman envoys arrived, Mithradates did not create any disturbance but after bringing some counter-charges . . . he remained quiet. Nikomedes, however . . . invaded his territory.'<sup>79</sup> This tradition, which *per se* is certainly not anti-Roman, makes Mithradates a victim of the aggression of Nikomedes (Cass. Dio) or the representatives of Rome (Appian). Other sources imply that, on being informed of the Roman decision to restore the kings by means of the senatorial mission, Mithradates formed an alliance with Tigranes of Armenia and 'after that, understanding what a war he was instigating', he began enrolling auxiliaries from among the border-tribes, whose support he had already previously gained through various goodwill gifts while eagerly preparing himself for war against the Romans. He also ordered an army to come from Skythia, and armed the entire

78. The intentions of Mithradates are viewed in modern historiography through prejudiced Roman or western eyes; cf. this prejudice was already noted by W. Ihne (1879), 5, 297f., citing Ch. Merivale (1850), I, 34; but both these works are now, perhaps undeservedly, forgotten. For the *communis opinio*, cf. the eighteenth-century translation of the predecessor of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, ed. S. J. Baumgarten (1749), Pt. 8, 306-7; Mommsen (<sup>10</sup>1909), II, 265-9; 280-84; III, 137-8, with his usual perspicacity, speaks of the king's 'Politik des Friedens', but linked it to his 'Sultansart', his 'oriental' inconsistency. The characteristic thus defined by Mommsen is better analysed by C. Schneider (1967), I, 61-4, though it is called the 'Masslosigkeit des übermenschlichen'. Especially prejudiced against Mithradates are the influential views of Reinach (1895), 105, 109-14; M. Rostovtzeff and H.A. Ormerod (1932), 237-9; Geyer (1932), 15.2, 2168f.; Magie (1950), I, 195; 207-9 (dating events one year too late); Broughton (1938; repr. 1959), 512; Badian (1968), 58; Sherwin-White (1984), 121-31; McGing (1986), 82-8, *passim*; Glew (1977a), 381. Olshausen (1978), 426, noted correctly: 'Dass der König auf einen Konflikt solchen Ausmasses [gegen Rom] vorbereitet war, erlaubt . . . meines Erachtens nicht die Folgerung, dass er ihn also angestrebt, höchstens, dass er ihn vorausgesehen hat'.
79. Cass. Dio, 31 *Frg.* 99; according to Pelopidas, Mithradates' envoy, the king 'accepted the decision of the Romans' concerning Nikomedes, prior to the latter's invasion of Pontic territory (App., *Mithr.* 14).

East against the Romans'.<sup>80</sup> I suggest that we can discern two disparate elements in the account of Justinus. On the one hand Mithradates enrolled troops, a legitimate precaution in view of the hostile preparations of Nikomedes; on the other hand, Mithradates is charged with 'omnemque Orientem adversus Romanos armat', and with 'romanum meditabundus bellum', namely with planning and organizing an anti-Roman war. The actions of Mithradates, of which, indeed, we know only from Appian, are purely diplomatic. Even on being attacked by Nikomedes, he offered no resistance '... [and] although he had his forces in readiness, Mithradates retreated, because he wanted to have many and just points of contention for war'.<sup>81</sup> Again, insinuations of motives against facts. And we know their Bithynian origin, thanks to Appian. In the speech he attributes to the Bithynian ambassadors of Nikomedes, they tell the Romans that Mithradates is ready for 'a great and predetermined war' (*ὄς ἐπι μέγαν δὲ καὶ ἐγνῶσμενον πόλεμον*), that he fears their increasing power,<sup>82</sup> that Mithradates 'is making preparations under pretence that they are intended for us, but he intends to attack you [the Romans] if he can. . . .'<sup>83</sup> Had Mithradates really feared their increasing power, he would have had recourse either to acquiescence with Roman demands, or to an immediate pre-emptive strike. Yet, he did neither but continued his attempts to prove his strict adherence to the *philia kai symmakhia* with Rome by diplomatic means.<sup>84</sup> He acted, I submit, not as 'a cautious opportunist',<sup>85</sup> but as king of a

80. Justin. 38.3.5-6. The sequence of events in Justinus runs counter to that in Memnon (cf. n. 73). Cf. *Glew (1977a)*, 390-95; *contra*, *Bulin (1983)*, 49-52. For the tribal component in the army of Mithradates, cf. Justin. 38.7.3; App., *Mithr.* 13;15; 16; 19; 69.

81. App., *Mithr.* 11 (*ad fin.*); 12.

82. Could anyone in 90 BC have spoken of Rome's 'increasing power'? Cf., e.g., Sulla's accusations in Appian (*Mithr.* 58); and cf. *Sherwin-White (1984)*, 127-9.

83. App., *Mithr.* 13.

84. App., *Mithr.* 12; 14-16; 56 (*ad fin.*), Mithradates speaking: 'All that I did in self-defence was the result of necessity rather than of intention'. Florus 1.40.3; Cass. Dio, 31 Frg. 99.2; Eutrop. 5.5.1; cf. *Bengtson (1975)*, 259.

85. Thus *Glew (1977a)*, 393; cf. *McGing (1986)*, 87 (and cf. 144): 'Mithradates' actions in Asia Minor before the first war with Rome are marked by caution, opportunism and a sense of experiment'; *Keaveney (1982)*, 197; 'Mithradates was a supreme opportunist'.

small state striving to maintain his dignity and a certain independence of action. Though he resented Roman interference with his affairs (cf. n. 14 above), he did his best to avoid getting involved in a war against them.

Appian's narrative leaves no doubt that Marius Aquillius had been 'the principal instigator (*ton milista aition*) of this embassy and this war' (*Mithr.* 21).<sup>86</sup> Since official Roman embassies were dispatched on the base of a senatorial decision,<sup>87</sup> it seems likely that by 'principal instigator' Appian meant that already in the course of the debate in the Senate Aquillius had pressed for the adoption of an activist policy against Mithradates. Though he had failed to convince the Senate to adopt his policy, he was sent out as head of a mission, an unfortunate but not unusual choice.<sup>88</sup> Modern research has offered various explanations for the motivation of Aquillius in acting as he did, ranging from his being a representative of equestrian interests, to a wish to provide Marius with an Asian command, to undefined personal interests, or even to unmitigated avarice.<sup>89</sup> Mithradates clearly believed that the personal rapacity of Aquillius represented a more general Roman predatoriness, and, when given the opportunity, duly requited it.<sup>90</sup> Aquillius, after serving with distinction under Marius in the Cimbrian war, had missed sharing a tri-

86. As so often, *Mommsen* (<sup>10</sup>1908), II, 282, stated the facts concisely and precisely: 'Obwohl weder der Senat noch König Mithradates noch König Nikomedes den Bruch gewollt hatten, Aquillius wollte ihn und man hatte Krieg'; for a parallel development in 83 BC, cf. p. 39 below.

87. *T. Mommsen* (<sup>1</sup>1887; repr. 1963), 677; *Bowman* (1987), 128.

88. *Bowman* (1987), 131; *Glew* (1977a), 393-4; *Sherwin-White* (1984), 115-18.

89. *Luce* (1970), 187-90 (to create a command for Marius), or, *Harris* (1979), 100 (equestrian financial interests, but cf. 273 — personal gain); or, *Glew* (1977), 396 (greed), or more plausibly, *Sherwin-White* (1984), 119-20, who tries, however, to shift the responsibility to the Senate and the two praetors, C. Cassius and Q. Oppius; *contra McGing* (1986), 81. *Reinach* (1895), 111, expresses the modern *communis opinio*, when he states that Aquillius was determined to gain 'Gold oder Ruhm'. *Olshausen* (1972), 813; *id.* (1978), 426, preferred to leave the question open.

90. Sall., *Hist.* 4.69.5: 'Namque Romanis . . . una et ea vetus causa bellandi est: cupido imperi et divitiarum'; cf. *ibid.*, 17.20.22; Justin. 38.7.; App., *Mithr.* 16; 56; cf. *Raditsa* (1969), 69-72; 75-81; *B. Forte* (1972), 112-14; *G.E.M. de Ste. Croix* (1981), 345; 620, n. 5. For the sources on the end of Aquillius, see *Magie* (1950), II, 1103, n. 33, which are contradicted by Licinianus 35.75 (Criniti); *I.G. Kidd* (1988), II. 874f.

umph for Vercellae by being assigned the command against Athenion in Sicily.<sup>91</sup> The nature of the war forced him to be satisfied with the lesser honour of an 'ovatio', though he had displayed great personal courage in combat.<sup>92</sup> Immediately after that he was brought to trial on a *repetundae* charge, and Cicero, for one, believed him guilty of avaricious extortion.<sup>93</sup> In spite of his guilt, M. Antonius managed to procure his acquittal by means of a sleazy mixture of maudling patriotism and sentimental hero-worship. Aquillius must have been in his fifties when he got his appointment in Asia Minor (having been consul ten years earlier). He probably saw in this appointment a last chance of equalling his father's achievement of scoring a triumph and making some money on the side (cf. n. 24 above). For a peaceful resolution of the problem, which would also have benefited Rome at that juncture, Aquillius was the wrong man, at the wrong time and in the wrong place.

As has already been noted, the task of the mission, as defined by the Senate, had been the restoration of Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes to their respective kingdoms. Nikomedes, at least, 'had promised to give large sums of money to the *stratego*i and the ambassadors for their military aid.'<sup>94</sup> This would seem unnecessary, since the Senate had already mandated them to do just this. According to Cassius Dio (31.99), Mithradates 'proved his wealth to the envoys' after their arrival, another act without visible reason, unless we suppose that Aquillius and his colleagues decided to auction off the territories they were supposed to restore. For this there was the precedent of his father in the matter of Phrygia. With borrowed money Nikomedes regained his kingdom, but proved unable to repay the

91. Plut., *Mar.* 14.7; D. S. 36.10, but Florus 2.7.11-12.

92. Cic., *de Or.* 2.195; Poseidonios, *Frg.* 253. 79-80 (Kidd). For the 'ovatio' in this context, cf. Florus 2.7.8.

93. Cic., *Pro Flacc.* 98. Other sources for his trial, in *Greenidge-Clay* (?1960), 116; cf. *Badian* (1964), 45-7; *Gruen* (1968), 194f; *R.M. Kallet-Marx* (1989), 312, for the political timing of the trial to 95 BC. *Rauh* (1986), 38f, lists him as 'a businessman' in politics (erroneously giving his title as 'praetor').

94. App., *Mithr.* 11.



Roman loans.<sup>95</sup> C. Cassius and M' Aquillius urged Nikomedes and Ariobarzanes 'to invade the territory of Mithradates and to stir up war' (*es polemon eredizein* — App., *ibid.*). This seems to mean that the loans to the kings were the lever to an end, and that their immediate goal was to start a war against Pontos rather than to receive immediate repayment of debts, though this might be a beneficial by-product of the venture.<sup>96</sup>

Ariobarzanes avoided compliance, but Nikomedes invaded Pontos 'as far as the city of Amastris'.<sup>97</sup> Mithradates first sent an envoy, Pelopidas, to remonstrate with the local representatives of Rome. When he failed to obtain from them a promise to restrain Nikomedes, he apparently sent a legation to Rome (winter of 90/89 BC?). The answer of the Senate to his reasonable request was no more forthcoming than that of its representatives in Asia had been; Mithradates was ordered 'to give back Kappadokia to Ariobarzanes and remain at peace with Nikomedes . . . furthermore [the Senate]

95. According to Appian (*ibid.*), Nikomedes had borrowed the money to pay the envoys and the *strategoï* (note the plural in both cases) for their military/auxiliary aid (*epikouria*) from the Romans accompanying them (*oi epomenoi Rōmaioi*), i.e. from members of the staffs of the envoys and/or the governors of Asia and Kilikia. Here, as in Sicily in 104 BC (D.S. 36.3.3), these anonymous troublemakers played a crucial role in bringing on war. Some of them, at least, must have been part of the 'Roman synhedrion' (App., *Mithr.* 14), who — though 'put to shame, and at a loss what to answer' [to Pelopidas] — precipitated Mithradates' renewed invasion of Kappadokia (App., *Mithr.* 15). Mithradates alluded to them in his speech (Justin. 38.7.7), as did Cicero later on (pro l. Man.7.17-18; in *Verr.* 2.1.10 (27); *ad Q. Fratr.* 1.1.10-15 *passim*); cf. *G.H. Stevenson* (1939), 85ff; *I. Shatzman* (1975), 54f; 64-8; 75-9; 167-76 (esp.173f); 193f; 265f; 281, has assembled an impressive amount of evidence on the collusion of legates, governors, and financiers. The Senate must have been aware of the dangers latent in the system, in which Roman financiers funded Roman military intervention at the request of client kings, because in 94 BC it tried to limit such moneylending; cf. *Ascon.* 57. 9-10; *Cass. Dio*, *Frg.* 97.1; *E. Badian* (1972), 147, n. 36; *Marshall* (1985), 217; *P. Green* (1990a), 189.

96. App., *Mithr.* 12;14; *Sall., Hist.* 4.69.10; *Justin.* 38.5.10; *Florus* 1.40.3; cf *Glew* (1977), 396f. For a different interpretation, that shifts the blame to Cassius, cf. *Sherwin-White* (1977a), 75; *id.* (1984), 112-20.

97. App., *Mithr.* 11; according to *Str.* 12.3.1, Amastris was the original western boundary of Mithradates. *Glew* (1972), 397, suggested 'that Nikomedes' invasion was confined to a region to which, in Roman eyes, at least, the king probably had only a tenuous claim'.

ordered him never to send anyone else, unless he should render them obedience',<sup>98</sup> meaning that the Senate pursued the same policy as that enunciated in its name by Marius and Sulla beforehand, and warned Mithradates against taking unilateral action,<sup>99</sup> but did not decide on war in the East at a time when it was striving to end the Social war, *inter alia*, by legislative means.<sup>100</sup>

Meanwhile, events in Asia took a turn for the worse. In a fit of pique, 'having been denied justice by the Romans [in Asia Minor] in this public manner, Mithradates sent his son Ariarathes IX with a large force to be king of Kappadokia. Ariarathes took it immediately and Ariobarzanes was thrown out'.<sup>101</sup> This time Mithradates had

98. Cass. Dio 31 Frg. 99.2; Eutrop. 5.5.1; Oros. 6.2.1. According to Appian (*Mithr.* 15) Pelopidas told the Roman representatives in Asia, that Mithradates 'intends to send an embassy to your Senate to complain' about their conduct. Without waiting for a decision from Rome, they began to gather troops for a grand three-pronged invasion of Pontos (*Mithr.* 17; 19; cf. SIG<sup>3</sup>, 742 l. 10). Some modern scholars disbelieve the evidence for a Mithradatic mission to Rome at this time; cf. *P. Desideri* (1973), 240f, 267, and date it to the nineties, to the time when Nikomedes IV became king. Though Appian does not expressly state that such a mission was sent to Rome, it seems that the statement that the Romans 'did not wait to hear what the Senate and People of Rome would decide about such a great war' (App., l.c.), may hint that the problem had indeed been referred back home.
99. Cf. n. 58 above; App., *Maked.* 11.5 (the case of Perseus); *Mommsen* (<sup>10</sup>1908), II, 282: 'Genau dieselbe Politik hatte man gegen Karthago angewendet: man liess das Schlachtopfer von der römischen Meute überfallen und verbot ihm gegen dieselbe sich zu wehren'.
100. For the *Lex Julia* and *Lex Calpurnia*, cf. *Greenidge-Clay* (1961), 142 (end of 90 BC); the *Lex Plautia Papiria* and the *Lex Pompeia*, *ibid.*, 151-3 (early 89 BC). For an assessment of Rome's military situation in Italy at that time, cf. *Schur* (1942), 120-23; *E.T. Salmon* (1967), 359-63.
101. App., *Mithr.* 15; Liv., *Ep.* 76. Dated to 89 BC by *Badian* (1976), 109; 122, n. 18. The coins of years 12 to 15 of Ariarathes IX belong to 89-86 BC; cf. *Simonetta* (1961), 18-19; *Mørkholm* (1962), 411. *Magie* (1950), II, 1104f., n. 41, showed conclusively that Ariarathes IX and Arkathias, son of Mithradates (App., *Mithr.* 35; 41; called Ariarathes in Plut., *Sulla.* 11), who fell sick and died in Macedonia, are two different persons. Therefore the date of the death of Arkathias has no bearing on the date of the end of Ariarathes IX's rule in Kappadokia. For the outbreak of hostilities in 89 BC rather than in 88 BC, as posited since Reinach, and the importance of this re-dating for forming a more correct estimate of the policy of Mithradates Eupator, cf. *Sherwin-White* (1980), 1981-95; *id.* (1984), 121-31; *Sullivan* (1990), 41f; 347, n. 28.

to use Pontic and/or local forces, since his ally, Tigranes II of Armenia, was exploiting internal Parthian difficulties at the end of the reign of Mithradates II (the Great) and after his death, to expand his realm south-eastwards, into Atropatene (Azerbaijan), Adiabene, Media and, later on, Syria.<sup>102</sup> This development not only removed a convenient diplomatic screen, but also meant that no help against the Romans would be available from this quarter in the imminent war.<sup>103</sup> It even may have delayed a full-scale military riposte by Mithradates to Roman provocations.

Immediately after rejecting the last proposal of Pelopidas to refer the settlement of their disputes to Rome, the Roman commanders 'began to collect forces from Bithynia, Kappadokia, Paphlagonia and the Galatians of Asia'. This was done rashly and impetuously (*ouk eubouliai mallon ēpropetōs*) without 'waiting to hear what the Senate and the people of Rome would decide about such a great war'.<sup>104</sup> In their final talks with Pelopidas, the Roman commanders had made clear their intention to restore Ariobarzanes to Kappadokia. A campaign to make good on this statement was fully covered by their original mandate from the Senate. But, whatever their strategy,<sup>105</sup> both the routes chosen by Aquillius and by Cassius, and the magnitude of the forces they enrolled,<sup>106</sup> ostensibly for this purpose, tended to show that their target was Pontos rather than Kappadokia. Only the force commanded by Q. Oppius attempted to

102. E. Bevan (1902; repr. 1966), 261-3; Manandyan (1943), 47-51; A.G. Bokščanin (1966), II, 31f; D.H. Bivar (1983), 38-42; Raditsa (1983), 99; D.M. Lang (1983), 516; R.N. Frye (1984), 214-16.

103. Arkathias, son of Mithradates, commanded a cavalry force of 10,000, recruited from Armenia Minor, in the first engagement of the war, in which Nikomedes' invading army was annihilated; App., *Mithr.* 17-18. These were probably mercenaries in Pontic service, as were Nemanes the Armenian (App., *Mithr.* 19), and the *strategos Taxiles* (Plut., *Luc.* 26.3; Sulla 15.1; Memnon, F. 24. 4), or the Armenians settled in Olbia; cf. IOSPE, I<sup>2</sup>, 35; Yu.G. Vinogradov (1989), 252-6 (with earlier bibliography).

104. App., *Mithr.* 15-17; 19; cf. Sall., *Hist.* 4.69.10; SIG<sup>3</sup> 742. I. 10 (for 'the unexpectedness' of the war).

105. For a recent discussion of the various data, see McGing (1986), 108, n. 95.

106. App., *Mithr.* 17; Justin. 38.3. H.A. Ormerod (1932; repr. 1951), 240, n. 1, already noted that the figures for the armies of Nikomedes and of the Romans are impossible, but beyond correction.

invade Kappadokia (*epi tōn orōn tōn kappadokias*, App., *Mithr.* 17).<sup>107</sup> While Mithradates' generals routed Nikomedes, who had advanced into Pontos up to the Amnias valley, an Italian embassy came to the king at Amisos, 'asking him to bring an army into Italy against the Romans; for if they joined forces the might of Rome would easily be overthrown. Mithradates replied that he would lead his armies to Italy when he had set Asia in order'.<sup>108</sup> This answer, as well as the usually accepted interpretation of the reverse of the relevant aureus, seem to indicate that Mithradates did not reject their offer outright, but rather deferred the implementation of the alliance. I suggest that a mutilated phrase in John of Antioch, connecting the outbreak of the civil war in Rome with the rise of Rome's hatred for Mithradates, may have something to do with this threatened invasion of Italy, always a Roman nightmare.<sup>109</sup> Hence, also, comparisons of Mithradates with Pyrrhus and Hannibal in the Roman tradition.<sup>110</sup>

After the defeat of Nikomedes, Roman resistance in Asia Minor practically collapsed.<sup>111</sup> Only Q. Oppius managed to organize local defence on the borders of Phrygia and Karia, possibly utilizing his family's connections in the area. Laodikeia on Lykos and Aphrodisias managed to fight off the generals of Mithradates, and

107. *Broughton* (1986), 152f., continues to date his proconsulship in Kilikia to 88 BC, but this is based solely on the erroneous assumption that the war began in that year. For the sources on his title and activities, cf. *Münzer* (1939), 740f; *E. Badian* (1984), 99f. (with the new evidence from *J. Reynolds* (1982), docs. 2, 3, 11-20). For the extensive business interests of the Oppii in the second and first centuries BC in Asia Minor, cf. *Rauh* (1986), 270-73.

108. D.S. 37.2.11; according to App., *Mithr.* 112, Mithradates concluded an alliance with the Samnites. *E. Gabba* (1976), 119; 247f., n. 371, dates the Italian embassy to 88 BC, after the 'Ephesian Vespers'. For the relevant coins, cf. *Greenidge-Clay* (1961), 283f; *Salmon* (1976), 75f.; 370; *Bulin* (1983), 53-6; *A. Keaveney* (1987), 157f., 161, n. 30.

109. Cited in D.S. 38.5.

110. Vell. Pat. 2.18.1; Florus 1.40.2. It is unlikely that this image of the king was a result of his desperate plan of invading Italy in 64/3 BC, when he was virtually a fugitive (Florus 1.40.25-6; App., *Mithr.* 101-2; 109; Plut., *Pomp.* 41; Cass. Dio 37.11.1-4); on this plan, see *L. Havas* (1968), 13-25; *Bengtson* (1975), 275; *McGing* (1986), 122f.; 165; but *Kleiner* (1953), 88.

111. App., *Mithr.* 19-20; Memnon; F. 22.6-8; Oros. 6.2.1-2; Eutrop. 5.5.2; for discussion of the military details of Mithradates' campaign, cf. *Magie* (1950), I, 212-15; II, 1100-1102; *McGing* (1986), 108, n. 95.

only the arrival of the king himself with his main army forced them to surrender.<sup>112</sup> By mid-December 89 BC, after the tribunes for 88 BC had taken office, the news of Mithradates' invasion of Asia had reached Rome. The Romans now officially declared war against him and by lot the *provincia* Asia, namely the war against him, fell to the newly-elected consul, Sulla.<sup>113</sup> But only early in 87 BC was the general finally able to embark on this task.<sup>114</sup> Mithradates had made good use of the time involuntarily granted him by the Romans, and his troops had occupied considerable parts of Greece, notably Athens,<sup>115</sup> thus bringing the war uncomfortably closer to Italy (Florus 1.40.9: 'Italiam iam ipsamque urbem Roman regius terror adflabat'; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.18.3).

The military and administrative tasks that confronted Mithradates in the newly-occupied territories need not concern us here. Even before the outbreak of hostilities Mithradates had spent no mean effort in building up an image of himself as a traditional Hellenistic king, a defender of Hellenism against the encroachments of barbaric neighbours.<sup>116</sup> But as Rostovtzeff rightly noted more than 50 years ago (in 1941), in the course of the war against Rome 'the cardinal political ideas of Mithradates underwent a notable change'.<sup>117</sup>

112. App., *Mithr.* 20; Reynolds (1982), doc. 2, B ll. 1-4; 11-16. Oppius' success stands in marked contrast to the failed attempt of 'C. Cassius, Nikomedes and all the Roman ambassadors who were with the army' to levy and train recruits near Leōnton Kephālē in northern Phrygia (App., *Mithr.* 19; cf. Sherk [1969], 260-62, No. 48; C.B. Welles [1934], 294-9, Nos. 73, 74, for the help provided for Cassius by Khaeremon of Nysa).

113. For sources and dating, cf. Sherwin-White (1980), 1985-88; *contra*, cf. Mitchell (1979), 60-62.

114. For the troubled year of 88 BC, that delayed Sulla's departure from Rome, see now A. Keaveney (1983), 53-86 (with discussion of earlier bibliography).

115. For the principal sources, cf. Greenidge-Clay (<sup>2</sup>1961), 169f; the most frequently cited modern studies are Reinach (1895), 128-39, and W.S. Ferguson (1911), 440-59; for current views, cf. Badian (1976), 105-28; Mc Ging (1986), 118-26; G.R. Bugh (1992), 108-23 (both with relevant bibliography). The article of U. v. Wilamowitz-Mollendorf (1923), V/1, 204-19, still towers above the crowd. For 'Athenas, civitas Achaiae', cf. E.J. Penella (1980), 447-8.

116. Cf. n. 10 above; H. Bengtson (<sup>2</sup>1960), 496f; Schneider (1963), I, 374f; 796-8; II, 722f; 772. M.J. Price (1968), 2-4; Mc Ging (1986), 39-41; 84f.; 89-97.

117. Rostovtzeff (1959), II, 835.

It has, indeed, been claimed that 'this was no mere war but a genuine anti-Roman crusade'.<sup>118</sup> His victories over Roman representatives in Asia Minor transformed Mithradates in the eyes of many of his Greek contemporaries from an Anatolian dynast involved in local struggles into 'a god and saviour' (*kai teon kai sōtēra*), concerning whom 'oracles everywhere proclaim his rule over the *oikoumenē*'.<sup>119</sup> Anti-Roman oracles, that had circulated in the Hellenistic East since Magnesia, were revived and probably new ones were added at this time.<sup>120</sup> They foretold not only an oriental king's victory over Rome, but promised that threefold retribution would be exacted from Romans and Italians for past insults and injuries.<sup>121</sup> About 20 years later, in 69 BC, Mithradatic propaganda maintained that the Romans, the 'latrones gentium', 'arma in omnis habent' (wage war on everyone).<sup>122</sup> For his war against Rome Mithradates needed the active voluntary support of both his Greek and his non-Greek subjects and allies. The depiction of the Romans as the common enemy of mankind, probably already propagated in 89/88 BC, was meant to bridge the inherent contradictions of aims between the various components of the king's 'grand alliance'. And, indeed, for a time Mithradates succeeded. Thirty years later, in 59 BC, Cicero (*pro Flacco* 60) spoke of 'the almost total obliteration

118. F.E. Peters (1972), 317. Kahrstedt (1948), 292, even after WW II remained true to his racist theories: '... denn alsbald wird der Aufstand Sache des Proletariats . . . der Fanatismus des Asiaten gegen den Weissen und des Proletariers gegen das Kapital schlagen in einer ungeheuren Flamme zusammen'. For the use of *imitatio Alexandri* as an expression of a Hellenistic anti-Roman ideology in the silver and gold coinage of Mithradates VI Eupator, cf. C. Bohm (1989), 155-84; 202-4; Green (1990), 561-2.

119. D.S. 37.26; Athen. S. 213b; Cic., *pro Flacco* 60-61; Plut., *Mor.* 624B; cf. D. Glew (1988b), 253-6; for a plastic representation of Mithradates from Pergamon, cf. G. Kraemer (1925), 183-205; J.J. Pollitt (1986), 35-7; but, as Magie (1950), II, 1102, n. 31, observed, Mithradates had taken the name 'Dionysos' long before the war.

120. Sanford (1950), 34-6; J.-D. Gauger (1980), 225-61 (with discussion of earlier bibliography); Bohm (1989), 184-7.

121. *Orac. Sibyll.* 3, 350-55; cf. IV. 145-8; VIII. 65-75 (ed. J. Geffcken [1902], 66, 99, 145f); S.K. Eddy (1961), 178-81; H. Fuchs (?1964), 7-8; 35-6; B. Forte (1972), 113; A.N. Sherwin-White (?1973), 400-402, stresses the negative role of the 'Italici'; McGing (1986), 102-5.

122. Sall., *Hist.* 4.69.20; 22; cf. Welles (1934), 295, No. 74, ll. 6-7 (*tous koinous polemiou . . . Rōmaious*); cf. Radiša (1969), 285-9, 305f.

tion of all memory of whatever is called Roman ('nomen Romanum') and every trace of our rule from the Greek settlements and from their very records'.

The generation following the Roman annexation of the Pergamene kingdom had seen a mighty influx of Roman and Italian immigrants and of less permanent inhabitants not only to the province Asia, but also to the adjacent territories of Asia Minor.<sup>123</sup> It was of their slaughter on a single day, throughout Asia Minor, that Cicero in the passage just quoted wished to remind his Roman audience:<sup>124</sup> '[Mithradates] sent letters throughout Asia, that whoever was a Roman was to be killed on a certain day and it was done'.<sup>125</sup> Now, *pace* Bowersock,<sup>126</sup> this seems remarkable. Seemingly nobody anywhere warned any of their Roman or Italian neighbours or relatives of what was coming. Even if the order was sent 'secretly to all his satraps and rulers of poleis',<sup>127</sup> preparations to carry it out must have involved a certain diffusion of information. Nothing like it occurred earlier or later in any part of the Roman empire.<sup>128</sup> Even if some individuals and communities preferred to abstain from participation in the massacre, 'such were the misfortunes that befell the Romans and Italians in Asia, men, women, and children, their freed-

123. *J. Hatzfeld (1919)*, 242-55, 322-7, *passim*. *T.R.S. Broughton (1938)*, 535f., 543; *Rostovtzeff (1959)*, II, 817f., 937; III, 1526f., n. 93; *E. J. Jonkers (1959)*, 10f., 17-19, 29-33; *A.J.N. Wilson (1966)*, 121-6; *de Ste. Croix (1981)*, 529; *Rauh (1986)*, 661-3, nn. 4 and 6, has assembled the bibliography on Roman traders and businessmen.

124. Cf., *Cic., pro l. Manilia* 3.7; 5.11.

125. Thus, succinctly, *Anon., de vir. ill.* 76.3; *Oros.* 6.2.2; *Cp. App., Mithr.* 58; *Val. Max.* 9.2 Ext. 3; *Cass. Dio* 33 Frg. 109.8; *Memnon*, Frg. 22. 9; *Eutrop.* 5.5.2; *Plut., Sulla* 24; cf. *Keaveney (1987)*, 8-10.

126. *G.W. Bowersock (1965)*, 1; cf. 101-3.

127. *App., Mithr.* 22. The message to the *poleōn archousi* was probably directed to representatives of the local ruling classes, not to royal governors (*satrapai*).

128. When Arkhelaos allegedly killed 20,000 men, 'most of whom were Italians' (*App., Mithr.* 28), on Delos, this was done in the course of battle. For the numbers of victims, cf. n. 130 below. Likewise, the massacres of Romans and Italians at Cirta and Vaga during the Jugurthine War occurred in the course of the aftermath of military operations; cf. *Sall., BJ* 26.3; 47.1; 67.3. Later instances, adduced by *B. Levick (1967)*, 168, nn. 2-3, were local events, on whose background we lack information.

men and slaves, all who were of Italian blood. By this it became most clear that it was not fear of Mithradates but rather hatred of the Romans that caused the Asiatics to perpetrate this'.<sup>129</sup> The slaughter of tens of thousands of Romans and Italians<sup>130</sup> throughout Asia Minor on a single day expresses the feelings of the entire Asiatic population at the time (*pantes oi Asianoi*, Cass. Dio, *Frg.* 101), even if at least a part of it, especially the lower classes and the slaves, was able to make a handsome profit for the time being.<sup>131</sup>

129. App., *Mithr.* 23; Justin. 38.7.8 (Roman conduct induced the hatred); Cass. Dio 31 *Frg.* 101.1 (except Tralles); Memnon, F.22.9 (many obeyed); only Orosius (6.2.3) and Augustinus (*C.D.* 3.22), for purposes of their own, graphically stress the coercion of the locals by Mithradates to carry out his order. Individuals, such as Khaeremon of Nysa (*Sherk [1984]*, 60f., No. 60), and communities, such as Rhodes, Kos (*Tac., Ann.* 4.14.3), Tabae (*Sherk [1969]*, 100-104, No.17, ll.1-3), Stratonikeia (*Sherk [1969]*, 105-111, No. 18; ll. 6-10; 44-8; 83-6) and either Magnesia-ad-Maeandrum or Magnesia-ad-Sipyllum (cf. *Mc Ging [1986]*, 111, n. 110), remained loyal to Rome. The beloved P. Rutilius Rufus remained in Asia Minor throughout and after the war, though the version of Theophanes of Mytilene, that he incited Mithradates to massacre the Romans, is pure slander, as Plutarch well knew (*Plut., Pomp.* 37.3); cf. *F. Münzer (1914)*, 1275f. He, surely, was not the only one, as is shown by Athenion's speech at Athens (*Athen.* 5. 213b). *Jonkers (1959)*, 17-19, stressed the business and social ties between the resident Romans and Italians and the indigenous population.
130. The exact number of the victims cannot be established though 80,000 is frequently cited; cf. *PA. Brunt (1971)*, 224-7.
131. App., *Mithr.* 22; for Mithradates' actions in 87/6 BC, cf. *Mithr.* 48; 61-2; *Oros.* 6.2.8; *Cic., pro Flacc.* 17. The slaves of Roman or Italian masters gained their freedom; 15,000 are said to have served with Mithradates' forces in Greece (*Plut., Sulla* 18.5). The use of slaves in the armed forces of Hellenistic rulers, or of Roman commanders, at the time, was not unusual; cf. *K.-W. Welwei (1977)*, 80-86, 112, 121, 158-63; *ibid.* (1988), III, 5-18, 121-32. Sulla in 84 BC 'issued a proclamation that the slaves who had been freed by Mithradates should at once return to their masters. Many disobeyed and some of the cities revolted. . . .' Though Appian does not specifically state it, we are left wondering whether the order of re-enslavement caused the revolt of some of the poleis. If this was the case, it would show that the freed slaves had been integrated in the citizen-body. Debtors, not necessarily members of the lower classes (*Cic., pro Flacc.* 38. 39), benefited from the remission of half their debt; cf., e.g., *Cic., pro Flacc.* 59; for a discussion of various modern views on the socio-economic standing of Mithradates' supporters, cf. *R. Bernhardt (1985)*, 36-9, 45-55; *McGing (1986a)*, 113-21; *Green (1990)*, 560-61. For Mithradates' political, calculated policy of *philanthropia*, directed towards the Greeks of Asia Minor and of mainland Greece during the opening stages of the war, cf. *Athen.* 5. 212a; *D.S.* 37.26; App., *Mithr.* 18: *doxan*



But did the massacre express the feelings of Mithradates himself towards Rome and the Romans, as certain modern scholars have deduced from the event?<sup>132</sup>

As we have seen (n. 125), the sources dwell on the fact that the massacre was ordered by Mithradates, namely that it was not a spontaneous mass reaction, and the fact that it was carried out on a single day is evidence of superb co-ordination. But only Memnon (F.22.9) offers an explanation: 'After that [Mithradates' naval battle at Rhodes],<sup>133</sup> Mithradates, understanding that the Romans who were scattered among the towns were an impediment to what he intended, wrote to all *poleis*. . . . ' Though Memnon apparently failed to get the sequence of events right, he offers a rational, political explanation for the order of Mithradates. The king seems to have come to the conclusion that he would not be able to consolidate his hold on the newly-acquired territories so long as a great number of Romans, with whom no accommodation could be reached, remained to foment disquiet in those areas.<sup>134</sup> The order, as we have seen, enjoyed broad popular support, and may have been intended to bind the perpetrators firmly to his rule. It has been stated that 'his action was a political blunder, for any reconciliation with Rome was henceforth out of the question'.<sup>135</sup> The so-called Peace of Dardanos was to show the fallacy of this view. At Rome the financial crisis, already made acute by the Social War, assumed catastrophic proportions due to the loss of Asia Minor.<sup>136</sup> It affected broadly those same

*emtoion philantrōpicas*; cf. *ibid.* 48; 62; *Glew (1977b)*, 253-6; for the *philanthropia* of Hellenistic kings, cf. *L. Koenen (ed.) (1957)*, 1-3, 24-33. For the promises of Mithradates, which were meant to inflame (*meteōrize*) the Athenians, cf. *J. Maliz (1983)*, 339f; *Kidd (1988)*, II, 869 (to F 253. 26-30); on the cancellation of debts under similar circumstances, cf. *A. Fuks (1970)*, 79-81.

132. *Mommsen* (<sup>10</sup>1909), II, 286: 'Es ist dieser ephesische Mordbefehl durchaus nichts als ein zweckloser Akt der tierisch blinden Rache . . . in [dem] hier der Sultanismus auftritt . . .'; cf. *id.*, (<sup>10</sup>1909), 3, 137f. (cited n.18 above). Again *Ihne (1879)*, V, 310f., offers a rational explanation for the decision of Mithradates.

133. *M. Janke (1963)*, 49f.

134. Thus, already, *Reinach (1895)*, 123f.

135. *Magie (1950)*, I, 217; cf. *Bengtson (1975)*, 260f.

136. *App., Mithr.* 22; *Cic., pro l. Man.* 14;17;19; *Jonkers (1959)*, 10f; 25-34, *passim*; *H. Schneider (1974)*, 123f., wrongly mentions only senators; for a correct view, cf. *C.T. Barlow (1978)*, 99, 121-5.

classes which suffered from the massacre, and their financial losses made them implacably inimical to Mithradates. Cicero (*pro I. Man.* 14–15) expressed this clearly: ‘Citizens, this province [Asia] has to be defended by you not only from calamity, but even from fear of a calamity, if you wish to retain what makes war possible or peace honourable’. Once he had attacked the province of Asia, Mithradates had nothing to lose as far as future relations with Rome were concerned.

‘All the Italians who escaped from Asia collected on Rhodes, among them L. [namely C.] Cassius the proconsul of Asia’.<sup>137</sup> Rhodes thus became a centre of Roman resistance to Mithradates, and its successful defence was to contribute considerably to the failure of the king in the first war against Rome. It was both a grave strategic and political error to divert most of his forces to a large-scale invasion of Greece while Rhodes remained unsubdued.<sup>138</sup> The extant sources describe the involvement in Greece as evolving naturally from the king’s actions in Asia,<sup>139</sup> an attempt to gain additional allies for the imminent confrontation.<sup>140</sup> Keeping close to the narrative of the sources, all too many modern scholars followed suit. Others offered explanations in accord with their general view of Mithradates,<sup>141</sup> none of which can be proved or disproved conclu-

137. App., *Mithr.* 24.

138. *Reinach* (1895), 139–42; *H.H. Schmitt* (1957), 123–9; for the sequence of events and the date of the siege of Rhodes and the invasion of Greece, cf., now *Sherwin-White* (1980), 1993–95; *id.* (1984), 125 (esp. n. 103)–131.

139. Florus 1.40.8: ‘Sed hic terror Asiae Europam quoque regi aperiebat’; Oros. 6.2.4; Eutrop. 5.6.1, with *R.J. Penella* (1980), 447–8; Liv., *Ep.* 78.

140. App., *Mithr.* 27.

141. *Reinach* (1895), 127, following Mommsen in part, believed that he fought for ‘hellenische Freiheit an beiden Gestaden des Archipels’; so did *Rostovtzeff* (1941), II, 835: ‘An independent Panhellenic monarchy . . . ; but cf. *Magie* (1950), I, 219: ‘Mithradates . . . carried away by a lust for conquest and power, had resolved to annex the Balkan Peninsula to his rule. . . .’; nationalism and socio-economic motives are imputed to Mithradates by *F. Oertel* (1927), 8, and by *U. Kahrstedt* (1948), 292, 295. *Sherwin-White* (1984), 134–5, calls it ‘an improvisation’, with ‘limited objectives’; Mithradates, always ‘sharp to press his advantage, but quick to withdraw from a dangerous position before reaching the point of no return . . .’ only wished to strengthen ‘his bargaining position for a final settlement’ (*Sherwin-White*, [1977a], 74). The error of *Sherwin-White*’s interpretation in this case is evident: Mithradates fed army after army into the Greek meat-chopper, till he was forced to sue for

sively. Already Mommsen denied that the invasion of Greece was but a step towards the invasion of Italy at that time.<sup>142</sup> Appian (n.140) tends to evoke the feeling that Mithradates, frustrated by military setbacks and bad omens,<sup>143</sup> decided to leave strategic and tactical decisions to his generals and advisers, in Lykia to Pelopidas and in Greece to Arkhelaos and Athenion.<sup>144</sup> Possibly, he was drawn into the Greek campaign without, at the time, being fully aware of the consequences.

In Greece public sentiment was much less anti-Roman than in Asia Minor. Delos, it is true, was mainly defended by Italians, but even at Athens, Aristion, an Athenian citizen in Pontic service, had to use 2,000 Pontic soldiers 'to make himself master of his fatherland, putting some to death immediately on the charge of favouring the Romans and sending others to Mithradates'.<sup>145</sup> Euboeia followed the lead of Eretria and Khalkis to join Mithradates, as did Thebes in

peace. McGing (1986), 121-3, recognized the importance of the problem, but rightly offered only tentative answers. He erred in affirming that 'the ancient sources . . . provide no explanation of why the king moved the war into Greece'.

142. Mommsen (<sup>10</sup>1908), II, 287: 'Mithradates hatte . . . den kühnen Entschluss gefasst wie Antiochos den Krieg um die Herrschaft über Asien in Griechenland zur Entscheidung zu bringen. . .'. Thus again, more recently, Cl. Nicolet (1978), 794-5.
143. App., *Mithr.* 27: 'Mithradates despaired of this undertaking too (cf. App., *Mithr.* 25; Memnon, F. 22.8; 23.2) and retired from Rhodes'; there follows his failure at Patara in Kilikia and the warning dream; cf. Jul. Obs. 56; and, probably mis-dated by Plutarch (*Sulla* 11.1), the fiasco with the Nikē at Pergamum, which caused Mithradates to be 'greatly despondent' (*athymia*). Seemingly, already after the failure to take Rhodes (end of 88 BC - winter 88/7 BC), not only after Khaironeia, as is often assumed in modern scholarship (cf., e.g., Sherwin-White [1984], 240-42, McGing [1986], 126-31), some Asian Greeks began to have second thoughts regarding Mithradates' chances of success; for Appian (*Mithr.* 27 *ad fin.*) makes Mithradates hold court at Pergamum 'to try those who were accused of conspiring against him, or inciting revolution, or generally "Romanizing"', already at the time that Arkhelaos was invading Greece (App., *Mithr.* 28); and see the evidence in *IGR* IV, 292, if we accept the dating of C.P. Jones (1974), 191-8.
144. App., *Mithr.* 28; Athen. 5. 212a.
145. App., *Mithr.* 28; cf. n. 113 above; for Delos, cf. Athen. 5. 214d - 215b; Str. 10.5.4; Paus. 3.23. 3-5; Rauh (1986), 181f; Bugh (1992), 112.

following Athens, while Sparta had to be coerced.<sup>146</sup> In northern Greece the Thracians joined Mithradates, but most of Macedon was not anti-Roman, while Thasos displayed exceptional loyalty to the Roman cause.<sup>147</sup> Except for Athens, no socio-economic motivation is mentioned by the sources and the decisions seem to have been mainly political. On the whole, Greece proved to be a liability, both monetary and military, for Mithradates.<sup>148</sup>

Though the loss of Athens and Piraeus, and the subsequent annihilation of two Pontic army corps at Khaironeia had 'astonished and frightened' Mithradates, he had immediately 'collected a new army from all his subject nations' (App., *Mithr.* 46). The final defeat by Sulla of this last force at Orkhomenos (second half of 86 BC), forced Mithradates to order Arkhelaos to open negotiations for peace.<sup>149</sup> Notwithstanding his undoubted tactical superiority, Sulla was glad to embark on negotiations for strategic and political reasons. The first meeting was arranged, aptly, by a Delian merchant.<sup>150</sup> Though his son had been killed in battle, Arkhelaos established a personal rapport with Sulla, that in the end caused him to go over openly to the Roman side.<sup>151</sup> The Pontic side was fully aware of Sulla's difficulties. When the Senate had dispatched the *consul suffectus* of 86 BC, L. Valerius Flaccus, and his legate C. Flavius Fimbria to the Mithradatic war, they were ordered to co-operate

146. Paus. 9.7.4; App., *Mithr.* 29-30; 54 (Thebes); Memnon F.22.10; but cf. App., *Mithr.* 29 (Spartan and Achaean troops sent to support Arkhelaos and Aristion); see *L.J. Piper (1986)*, 150f.

147. Licinianus 35. 76 (Criniti); Liv., *Ep.* 82; 83; App., *Mithr.* 35; 41 (Macedonian troops deserted to the Roman side before Khaironeia); Plut., *Sulla* 11.3-7; *Reinach (1895)*, 148, n. 3; *Sherk (1969)*, 114-23, Nos. 20, 21 (Thasos).

148. Estimates of Pontic troop losses in Greece are based on Sulla's *Memoirs* and therefore, certainly inflated; cf. *Magie (1950)*, II, 1106f.; *Sherwin-White (1984)*, 133f., 138-41; but cf. *D.B. Šelov (1986)*, 113-17, who believes that Appian also used Pontic sources.

149. App., *Mithr.* 54; Anon., *de Vir. Ill.* 76.5; Liv., *Ep.* 82; Sources for the battle, cf. *Greenidge-Clay (1961)*, 183f.

150. Plut., *Sulla* 22.4-5; App., *Mithr.* 58; Memnon F 35.1 (Sulla's initiative); for Sulla's predicament, cf. Plut., *Sulla* 22. 1-3; App., *Mithr.* 54; Licinian. 35.73 (Criniti); well summarized by *Sherwin-White (1984)*, 142; for sources, cf. *Greenidge-Clay (1961)*, 187f.

151. Licinian. 35.66 (Criniti); Plut., *Sulla* 23.1-2; App., *Mithr.* 64; Oros 6.2.12; Anon., *de Vir. Ill.* 76.5; 'classum eius proditione Archelai intercept'.

with Sulla 'if he were in accord with the Senate; if not — to join battle against him first';<sup>152</sup> the primary enemy for the government in Rome was Sulla, not Mithradates. After the appointment of Valerius Flaccus, superseding him in the command against Mithradates, Sulla lacked legitimacy in addition to his lack of funds and of a fleet. Accordingly, Arkhelaos proposed Pontic naval, military, and pecuniary support for Sulla's campaign against the Senate, in return for recognition of Mithradates' rule over Pontos and Asia. According to Sulla's *Memoirs*, he indignantly rejected this offer, but under a different name its partial acceptance became part of the peace of Dardanos.<sup>153</sup> The dramatic, probably fictitious, details of the preparatory stages that led up to the final agreement need not concern us here, except for Sulla's promise to endeavour 'to persuade the Romans not to remember what had taken place',<sup>154</sup> a promise of something that is not recorded as having been specifically requested. It meant that Mithradates was not only recognized as king of Pontos (probably including his acquisitions on the northern littoral of the Black Sea),<sup>155</sup> but was received back as a 'friend and ally of the Roman People', with a tacit claim to Pontic patronship of the Greek cities of western Asia Minor.<sup>156</sup> I submit that this shows Mithradates to have been a pragmatist, not an ideologue obsessed

152. Memnon F. 24.1; Plut., *Sulla* 20; 24.4: Sulla justified his agreement with Mithradates to his troops by saying that 'had Fimbria and Mithradates united against him, he could not have fought off both'. Whether this was true is another matter; cf. *Keaveney (1982)*, 105; *id.*, (1987), 184.
153. See the tradition preserved in Diodoros Siculos (38/9.6): '. . . [Sulla] made him an ally (*symmachos*), and taking over the king's fleet returned to Italy'; *contra*, Plut., *Sulla* 43 (Synkr. 5), based on Sulla's version of the agreement. For the conditions of the Peace of Dardanos, cf. *Reinach (1895)*, 189-200; *Magie (1950)*, I, 229-31; II, 1109f., nn. 56, 58; *E. Badian (1970)*, 19; *Raditsa (1970)*, 205-10; *id. (1969-70)*, 632-5; *Sherwin-White (1984)*, 143-8.
154. App., *Mithr.* 55, cf. Licinian. 35, 78; Plut., *Sulla* 24 (Sulla greeted, embraced and kissed Mithradates at Dardanos).
155. App., *Mithr.* 55: '. . . [Mithradates] will remove his garrisons from all places except those that he held before this breach of the peace . . .'; but cf. *ibid.*, 58 (*ad fin.*: . . . *es ton Ponton epi tēn patrōan . . . monēn*), and 64.
156. This condition is found only in Memnon (F. 25.2-3), who observes that it was not fulfilled by the Romans.

with a hatred of Rome and Romans, as many have believed ever since Cicero stated this as a fact.<sup>157</sup>

The circumstances surrounding the unprovoked attack by L. Licinius Murena, the pro-praetor of Asia,<sup>158</sup> against Mithradates in 83 BC are eerily reminiscent of the outbreak of the war in 89 BC. 'The Second War of the Romans and Mithradates begins here. Murena, who had been left by Sulla . . . to settle the rest of the affairs of Asia sought trifling pretexts for war, being ambitious of a triumph'.<sup>159</sup> Again a Roman commander operated outside his *provincia*, without authorization for war and, *prima facie*, against the orders of the Senate. We hear of two senatorial embassies to Murena. Already the first of these, headed by Calidius,<sup>160</sup> in the year 82 BC, must have been dispatched after Sulla re-established his ascendancy in Rome in the spring to early summer of 82 BC, because it came in response to a complaint of Mithradates 'to the Senate and to Sulla to complain of the acts of Murena'.<sup>161</sup> Since Sulla had only had time 'to arrange such matters as were pressing and put some of his men in charge of the city',<sup>162</sup> Calidius came without a senatorial decree, but 'declared in the hearing of all that the Senate ordered him [Murena] to keep his hands off the king who was an ally. After he had spoken thus, he was seen talking to Murena alone'. Though what he privately told Murena remained unknown, the latter's subsequent invasion of the territory of

157. Cic., *pro I. Man.* 4.9; Sall., *Hist.* 1. Frg. 77.8 (L. Marcius Philippus in early 77 BC); 2. Frg. 47.7 (C. Cotta in 75 BC); Plut., *Lukull.* 5.1, citing the consul M. Aurelius Cotta as saying in 74 BC, but before the outbreak of hostilities, that 'the war is not dead, it only slumbers'; Florus 1.40.12-14; cf. *Glew (1981)*, 109-14, for Mithradates' compliance with the terms of the Peace of Dardanos prior to being attacked by Murena in 83 BC; and *Sherwin-White (1984)*, 147f.; 151f., for contradictory Roman attitudes on this matter.

158. *Magie (1950)*, 240-43; *Broughton (1986)*, 3, 123.

159. App., *Mithr.* 64; though defeated by Mithradates, he assumed the title of 'Imperator' (Syll. <sup>3</sup>, 745; I.G. 5.1.1454; Cic., *pro Mur.* 12; *pro I. Man.* 8), and was granted a triumph (Cic., *pro Mur.* 11-12; Licinian. 36.5 (Criniti)); cf. *N.S. Rosenstein (1990)*, 42.

160. For Calidius, cf. *Wiseman (1971)*, 220, No. 92; *Bulin (1983)*, 76-8; *Broughton (1986)*, 3, 45.

161. App., *Mithr.* 65; *Bulin (1983)*, 75f.

162. App., *B.C.* 1, 89.

Mithradates caused the king to believe that the Romans, while officially instructing their general to keep the peace, were privately urging him to attack. Consequently, he ordered a counter-offensive, in the course of which Murena was defeated as thoroughly as M' Aquilius had been in the previous war and with similar results. Many changed sides and defected to Mithradates.<sup>163</sup> The renewed Pontic occupation of Kappadokia occurred in self-defence and not as a result of Pontic aggression.<sup>164</sup> Consistent with his policy of upholding the legitimacy of the treaty of Dardanos, Sulla dispatched Aulus Gabinius to tell Murena to desist from further military actions and to reconcile Ariobarzanes and Mithradates.<sup>165</sup>

Again, as in 89 BC, Mithradates accepted all Roman demands, and persisted in his policy of maintaining peace with Rome.<sup>166</sup> Thus, both by Sulla and by Mithradates the Peace of Dardanos was apparently viewed as a final settlement of the affairs in Asia Minor. But, as much else, Sulla's arrangement remained unacceptable to most

163. App., *Mithr.* 66. Saprykin (1986), 230f., believes that the refusal of Herakleia Pontika to aid either of the belligerents (Memnon, F. 36.2) indicates a more general revulsion from Rome; and cf. Lomouri (1979), 104.

164. The question of Mithradates' compliance with the terms of the treaty of Dardanos as regards Kappadokia has caused controversy in modern discussions; cf. Glew (1981), 112-14. Appian (*Mithr.* 64) contains two contradictory statements:

1. Mithradates, before the attack of Murena, 'had not yet even restored the whole of Kappadokia to Ariobarzanes, but still retained a part of it';

2. Sulla had left Asia without having written the treaty of Dardanos, 'but had gone away after seeing what he proposed orally carried out in fact'. According to Appian (*Mithr.* 66) in 81 BC, 'Sulla however thought it was not right to make war against Mithradates when he had not violated the treaty'. It was only in 79 BC that 'Sulla ordered Mithradates to give up Kappadokia' (App., *Mithr.* 67), that is after Aulus Gabinius had formally reconciled Ariobarzanes and Mithradates, an occasion at which Mithradates demanded not only 'that he should retain that part of Kappadokia which he then held, but have another part in addition' (App., *Mithr.* 66). I believe that this shows that Kappadokia again became an issue only after the end of the Second Mithradatic War; but cf. McGing (1986), 135.

165. For Gabinius, cf. Broughton (1986), III, 97; Bulin (1983), 79-80. For the importance of the formal recognition of the treaty for Sulla, cf. Bulin (1983), 73, n. 7.

166. For recent different interpretations, cf. Lomouri (1979), 104f; Glew (1981), 121-4; McGing (1986), 135f., n.17; but cf. Manandyan (1943), 72.

Romans and failed in the long run. It was only when Sulla's death, in March of 78 BC, precluded any possibility of the ratification of the treaty by Rome, that Mithradates realized that no *modus vivendi* could be found with the current Roman establishment, and that he would have to look for other venues to maintain his own and his country's independence.<sup>167</sup>

I submit that the agreement between Mithradates and Sertorius shows that even then Mithradates preferred coexistence to confrontation with Rome. That Sertorius would fail where Sulla had succeeded, viz. in returning to Rome and becoming head of the legitimate government, he could not necessarily have foreseen,<sup>168</sup> especially in view of his sources of information, L. Magius and L. Fannius.<sup>169</sup> Mithradates' promise of money and ships to Sertorius is remarkably reminiscent of his deal with Sulla (cf. n. 153 above). Mithradates, even in 75 BC, was not anti-Roman *per se*.<sup>170</sup> He appointed a Roman senator M. Marius, sent to him by Sertorius, to command his troops and showed remarkable deference towards him.<sup>171</sup> Yet, he must have been aware, as the consul C. Aurelius Cotta said in 75 BC, that 'armies are maintained in Asia and Kilikia because of the excessive power of Mithradates',<sup>172</sup> while at Rome 'at

167. App., *Mithr.* 67-8, 70; for an attempt to approach Pompey in 75 BC, cf. Cic., *pro l. Manilia* 46.

168. For various modern views on Sertorius, cf. L. Wickert (1954), 97; to Gabba (1976), 103-5, 119-22, he seems at this stage to have been 'an anachronism', but I prefer the view of M. Gelzer (1963; first published 1932), II, 142-4, who saw in Sertorius the 'Haupt einer künftigen römischen Regierung'; and cf. Mithradates' speech at the outbreak of hostilities in Appian, *Mithr.* 70: '... Do you not see some of their noblest citizens (pointing to Varius and the two Luciuses) at war with their homeland and allied to us?'; a Roman senator, Attidius, had been with Mithradates for a long time by 67 BC (App., *Mithr.* 90), as had a tribune of 98 BC, C. Appuleius Decianus (Broughton [1952], 2.4f.). *Contra*, cf. McGing (1986), 142, 145.

169. App., *Mithr.* 68; 72; Plut., *Sert.* 23-4; Liv., *Per.* 93; Oros. 6.2.12; cf. McGing (1986), 137, n. 21.

170. *Contra*, cf. now McGing (1986), 138-45, who believes that the agreement with Sertorius, negotiations on which started in 76-75 BC, was 'the decisive point' at which the king committed himself to war. But he admits (139f.) that Mithradates' military preparations belong to the summer of 74 BC (App., *Mithr.* 69; Plut., *Lukull.* 7).

171. Plut., *Sert.* 24., 3-5; Oros 6.2.12; McGing (1986), 138, n. 24.

172. Sall., *Hist.* 2.47.7.



that time many were striving to ignite again a war against Mithradates'.<sup>173</sup> Both consuls of 74 BC, M. Aurelius Cotta and L. Licinius Lucullus, strove to receive a command in Asia Minor<sup>174</sup> well before the death of Nikomedes IV of Bithynia (after October 74 BC) made Rome the heir to his kingdom.<sup>175</sup> Therefore, though Mithradates himself admitted that he had begun military operations by invading Bithynia and, subsequently, attacking Kyzikos, this should be regarded purely as a pre-emptive strike, as Reinach already saw a century ago.<sup>176</sup> Though the Romans attempted to place the responsibility for the outbreak of the war on Mithradates, they were forced to admit that the Peace of Dardanos was at the root of the outbreak of the third and final war against Mithradates.<sup>177</sup>

The king was fully conscious that this new war 'would be an implacable one . . . that all would be now at stake'.<sup>178</sup> In 71 BC, Appius Claudius, the emissary of Lucullus to Tigranes of Armenia,<sup>179</sup> demanded that Mithradates be delivered to him, because 'he was needed for the triumph of Lucullus. For Lucullus, as for

173. Plut., *Lukull.* 5.1.

174. For the sources, cf. *Greenidge-Clay* (?1961), 250-51; in addition see the bibliography cited in *Glew* (1981), 127, n. 71.

175. For the sources, cf. *Greenidge-Clay* (?1961), 251; *Reinach* (1895), 313, n. 5; followed by *Lomouri* (1979), 107ff; *Glew* (1981), 128; *Sullivan* (1990), 344, n. 17, *et al.*

176. *Reinach* (1895), 315, 317, n. 1 for the date of the outbreak of hostilities in the spring of 73 BC, as against 74 BC, the date adopted by *Ormerod* (1932), 358f.; *Broughton* (1952), 106-8. *Olshausen* (1978), 431, in his bibliography on the Third Mithradatic War neglects the important contribution of Russian and Soviet historians.

177. Florus 1.40.12. The extant sources fail to mention a Roman declaration of war, possibly because this would have indicted the Romans for having broken the treaty of Dardanos prior to the invasions of Bithynia and Kappadokia by the king. For the declaration of war against Tigranes, cf. Plut., *Lukull.* 21; in Rome the *populares* spoke of Lucullus as involving Rome in war after war, 'though the state had no need for them'. *Sherwin-White* (1984), 161-5, believes both sides were eager for war, but admits that 'Mithradates was given very little opportunity to avoid war even if he so wished'; *McGing* (1986), 144f., blames Mithradates, thus obviating a Roman declaration of war.

178. App., *Mithr.* 69: *Mithridatēs men oun . . . kai tonde malista ton polemon egoumenos . . . aspeiston exein . . . ōs arti dē kriithesomenos peri apantōn.*

179. For Tigranes' failed policy of neutrality, cf. *Manandyan* (1943), 52f., 74.

Pompey later on, no peace with a free king was possible, only enslavement.<sup>180</sup> The Greek cities of Pontos, as shown by the desperate struggle of Amisos and Sinope, realized this and it caused them to fight staunchly for a king not necessarily beloved. Even Herakleia Pontika, though not part of Pontos, fought bravely against the Romans.<sup>181</sup> The native population of Asia Minor continued its fight against foreign exploitation,<sup>182</sup> when, by 71 BC, the regular troops had defected or had been decisively defeated,<sup>183</sup> and after Makhares, son of Mithradates and governor of Bosporos, had in 70 BC accepted the inevitable and become a client of Rome.<sup>184</sup> After spending 20 months of enforced idleness in Armenia,<sup>185</sup> Mithradates vigorously resumed the war against the Romans. 'All the resources of his powerful kingdom were now exhausted, but his spirit was enhanced by misfortunes. Therefore, turning to the proximate people, he involved almost the whole of the East and the North in his own ruin'.<sup>186</sup> The years 68–63 BC present us with the strange phe-

180. Plut., *Lukull.* 21.7; but cf. App., *Mithr.* 79; Plut., *Lukull.* 15 (Pomponius offers philia); App., *Mithr.* 98; 107. Cass. Dio. 36.45.3 (failed attempts to reach an agreement with Pompey); App., *Mithr.* 111 (Mithradates was aware of the danger of being led in a Roman triumph); 116 (his statue in Pompey's triumph). Cf. *Bengtson* (1975), 273.

181. Well and originally analysed by *M.I. Maksimova* (1956), 254-76; 279-81; *contra*, *Bernhardt* (1985), 66-71; 75; 126-8.

182. Cass. Dio 36.9.2; often neglected in this context is App., *Mithr.* 92: ' . . . They were called by the common name of Kilikians. Perhaps this evil had its origin in the men of Kilikia Trakheia, who were joined by men of Syrian, Kyprian, Pamphylian, and Pontic origin and those of almost all the eastern nations, who, on account of the severity and the length of the Mithradatic War, preferred to do wrong rather than to suffer it. . . .' The pirates clearly represent a popular socio-economic movement, originating in Asia Minor; cf. App., *Mithr.* 63, 92-3, 96; Str. 8.7.5; Florus 1.41. This interesting phenomenon merits a separate study; cf. *Olshausen* (1972), 814, n. 47.

183. App., *Mithr.* 79 (Phoenix, a member of the royal family, defected to Lukullus in the spring of 71 BC); 80-82.

184. App., *Mithr.* 83; Memnon, F 37.6; Liv., *Ep.* 98; Plut., *Lukull.* 24: 'When, in addition to this, Makhares, the son of Mithradates . . . sent to Lukullus . . . and asked to be recognized as a friend and ally of the Roman People, Lukullus believed the former war to have ended . . .'; there followed his war against Tigranes.

185. Memnon, F 38.1.

186. Florus 1.40.20-21; cf. Memnon, F. 38.7.

nomenon of a king without a country fighting Rome,<sup>187</sup> driven by will-power and a sense of purpose. Roman tradition, in rather uncomplimentary terms, likened Mithradates to 'a snake, which, though its head is crushed, threatens to the last with its tail'.<sup>188</sup> His final nemesis, Pompey, magnanimously provided for Mithradates' regal funeral,<sup>189</sup> 'because he admired his great achievements and considered him the first of the kings of his time'.<sup>190</sup>

Mithradates did not seek war with Rome for war's sake. He sought peace for as long as its attainment seemed feasible. In 89 BC and again in 83 BC he successfully repulsed Roman attacks. Finally, in 74 BC, when a renewed Roman military build-up caused him to suspect — rightly or not<sup>191</sup> — that a new attack was imminent, Mithradates 'decided to go to war, fought a war, and lost a war. It could not be otherwise, unless a small country has no right to fight for its liberties against a big one'.<sup>192</sup> With his death died the last of the independent Hellenistic kings,<sup>193</sup> one more victim of Roman policies and politics.

187. For the final battle for Pontos, cf. *Sherwin-White (1984)*, 191-3; *McGing (1986)*, 164, n. 93; For the organization of Pontos as a province by Pompey prior to the death of Mithradates, cf. *Liv., Ep.* 102; *Plut., Pomp.* 38; *Vell.* 2.38.8; *M. Gelzer (1949)*, 95-9; *Magie (1950)*, I, 360, 368-72; II, 1231-34.

188. *Florus* 1.40.24; cf. *App., Mithr.* 112: 'He was always high-spirited and indomitable, even in misfortune. Even when beaten he left no avenue of attack against the Romans untried'; *Cass. Dio* 37.11.1-2: 'Mithradates himself did not yield to misfortunes, but relying more on his will than his power . . . And if he was to fall, he preferred to perish along with his kingdom, with undiminished pride rather than live deprived of it in humiliation and disgrace'. The personal element of his wars was already stressed by *Ihne (1886)*, 6, 189f.

189. *App., Mithr.* 113; *Plut., Pomp.* 42.4; *Cass. Dio* 37.14.1.

190. *App., Mithr.* 113; *Vell.* 2.18.1: ' . . . virtute eximius, aliquando fortuna semper animo maximus, consiliis dux, miles manu, odio in Romanos Hannibal. . . '

191. *Glew (1981)*, 128-30, makes out a good case for mutual, unfounded suspicions leading to war.

192. *W.W. Tarn*, as cited by *Fuks (1984)*, 281.

193. *Vell.* 2.40.1.

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